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I. INTRODUCTION
Jennifer Bishop gave birth to a son shortly before 8 a.m. in July
of 1993. Because she had decided not to breast-feed her child, that
evening with dinner she received a tablet of Parlodel to prevent the
production of breast milk. The next several hours were horrible.
Within an hour and a half she became nauseated and vomited at least
twice. Her blood pressure rose, and her temperature increased to
over 102 degrees. Within three hours she became drowsy and then
rigid. Approximately four hours after taking the drug, she was
transferred to intensive care where she suffered respiratory arrest and
1
lapsed into a coma. Six hours later she was pronounced dead. In
2
Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals, Jennifer’s estate and her husband
sued Sandoz, the manufacturer of Parlodel, arguing the 2.5 mg she
ingested was a “direct and proximate cause” of her death. In support
of this position, the plaintiffs offered the opinions of a number of
experts. The plaintiffs asserted that the experts’ opinions were based
3
upon the standard medical methodology of “differential diagnosis.”
1

Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 14 P.2d 1170, 1173-74 (Kan. 2000).
According to the court, “[T]the autopsy reported that the probable cause of the
death was ‘related to postpartum eclampsia’ or ‘possible bacteremia.’” Definitions
are appropriate here to assist the reader: “postpartum” means “[a]fter childbirth;”
“eclampsia” is defined as the “[o]ccurrence of one or more convulsions, not
attributable to other cerebral conditions such as epilepsy or cerebral hemorrhage, in
a patient with preeclampsia;” and “bacteremia” is a condition characterized by
“viable bacteria in the circulating blood.” STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1413, 540,
181 (26th ed. 1995).
2
14 P.2d 1170.
3
Id. at 1177. In medical dictionaries, differential diagnosis is defined as a
“diagnosis based on comparison of symptoms of two or more similar diseases to
determine which the patient is suffering from.” TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 404 (14th ed. 1981). However, in legal usage the term is not restricted to
the process of distinguishing among diseases. Rather, the term also is used to
describe the process of differentiating among the possible causes of the plaintiff’s
ailment. That is what occurred in Kuhn. It is with respect to this latter, perhaps
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The defendant challenged the admissibility of this testimony. The
United Stated District Court for the District of Kansas, applying
4
Kansas’s version of the Frye test for admissibility of expert testimony,
ruled that the plaintiffs’ experts, “improperly offer medical causation
opinions concerning Parlodel without general acceptance of the
bases for those opinions within the relevant scientific community . . .
5
.” The Kansas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Frye test is
not applicable to the type of expert testimony at issue in this case.
In Kuhn, the court declined the judicial gatekeeping role in
cases where experts offer “pure opinion” testimony. Under the newly
announced pure opinion exception, the Frye test only applies “when
an expert witness reaches a conclusion by deduction from applying a
new or novel scientific principal, formula, or procedure developed by
6
others.” Opinions that do not rely on “techniques,” but rather are
“developed from inductive reasoning based on the expert’s own
7
experience, observation, or research” are not to be tested by Frye or
any other admissibility test. Rather, “[t]he validity of pure opinion is
8
tested by cross-examination of the witness.”
As the court correctly notes, once this exception is created a
critical question is whether the term “technique” is to be given a
9
narrow or broad meaning. The Kansas Supreme Court adopts a
narrow view of the term. According to the court, the plaintiff’s
experts’ opinions in Kuhn did not hinge on the validity of a scientific
principal, device, test, or procedure developed by another but rather
on the accuracy of their observation, the extent of their training, and
10
the reliability of their interpretations. None of these are subject to

incorrect usage, that differential diagnosis has become controversial in legal settings.
For a general discussion of differential diagnosis testimony, see Joseph Sanders &
Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility of Differential Diagnosis Testimony to Prove Causation
in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of Adjective and Substantive Law, 64 LAW. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 107 (2001); Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Clinical Medical Evidence of Causation in
Toxic Tort Cases: Into the Crucible of Daubert, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 369 (2001).
4
In Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.D. Cir. 1923), the court held that novel
expert testimony is admissible only when the scientific principle or technique from
which it is deduced has gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs. Kansas adopted the Frye “general acceptance” test in State v. Lowry, 185 P.2d
147 (Kan. 1947). For a more complete discussion of Frye, see infra Part II.
5
Kuhn, 14 P.2d at 1177.
6
Id. at 1179. Kuhn borrows the test from a Florida appellate court opinion,
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Tursi, 729 So. 2d 995, 997 (Fla. App. 1999).
7
Kuhn, 14 P.2d at 1179.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 1180.
10
Id. at 1182.
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11

Frye. It appears likely that Kuhn will remove most, if not all, medical
doctor differential diagnosis testimony from any judicial reliability
12
assessment.
The Kansas Supreme Court justified its holding with the
following arguments:
The distinction between pure opinion testimony and testimony
based on a scientific method or procedure is rooted in a concept
that seeks to limit application of the Frye test to situations where
there is the greatest potential for juror confusion . . . . The
distinction would be consistent with Kansas’ appellate decisions
applying the Frye test, almost all of which have involved devices or
tests surrounded by an “aura of infallibility” to which a trier of fact
13
might tend to ascribe “an inordinately high degree of certainty.”
Judges generally are not trained in scientific fields and, like
jurors, are lay persons concerning science. A Kansas jury has a
constitutional mandate to decide between conflicting facts,
including conflicting opinions of causation. The district judge . . .
controls expert opinion evidence that would unduly prejudice or
mislead a jury or confuse the question for resolution. Crossexamination, the submission of contrary evidence, and the use of
appropriate jury instructions form a preferred method of
14
resolving factual disputes.

To summarize, the court justifies its result by arguing for the
following five propositions: 1) jurors are relatively unconfused by
expert testimony that does not involve a “technique” such as a lie
detector; 2) jurors are less confused by testimony based on an
expert’s own investigations than they are by testimony based on the
investigations of other researchers; 3) jurors are less confused by
“inductive” reasoning than by “deductive” reasoning; 4) judges are no

11

Logerquist v. McVey reaches a similar conclusion in a case involving repressed
memory testimony. Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113 (Ariz. 2000). The Logerquist
court said:
[a]lthough compliance with Frye is necessary when the scientist reaches
a conclusion by applying a scientific theory or process based on the
work or discovery of others, under [Arizona Rules of Evidence 702 and
703] experts may testify concerning their own experimentation and
observation and opinions based on their own work without first
showing general acceptance.
Id. at 123.
12
The plaintiff’s three experts offered to testify that Parlodel caused or
contributed to Bishop’s death. They arrived at this result through a process of
“differential diagnosis” by which they considered and ruled out other causes. Id. at
1176-77.
13
Id. at 1181 (internal citations omitted).
14
Id. at 1182 (internal citations omitted).
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better than jurors in assessing the merits of a scientific argument; and
5) cross-examination, competing experts, and judicial instructions
are adequate to the task of clearing up any residual jury confusion.
Underlying the specific arguments in Kuhn is one central idea:
the jury is better able to assess arguments like those offered by the
plaintiffs’ experts than it is other types of expert evidence. Implicit in
this argument is the premise that restrictive evidentiary rules are best
justified, if they are justified at all, as a way to protect juries, litigants,
and the law itself from jury shortcomings. Restrictive rules are, in a
15
word, justified by appeals to paternalism.
The United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Kumho Tire Co.,
16
Ltd. v. Carmichael reflects this justification in the following passage:
And whether the specific expert testimony focuses upon
specialized observations, the specialized translation of those
observations into theory, a specialized theory itself, or the
application of such a theory in a particular case, the expert’s
testimony often will rest “upon an experience confessedly foreign
17
in kind to [the jury’s] own.” The trial judge’s effort to assure
that the specialized testimony is reliable and relevant can help the
jury evaluate that foreign experience, whether the testimony
18
reflects scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.

The arguments in Kuhn offer a springboard for a discussion of the
paternalistic justification and the empirical evidence now available to
assess the merits of this justification. Section II of this article situates
the Kuhn opinion within the context of the existing rules concerning
the admissibility of expert testimony, especially as they have
developed in the aftermath of the United States Supreme Court
19
opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. I note that
although Daubert changed the criteria to be used in assessing the
admissibility of expert testimony, it certainly was not the first opinion
to introduce paternalistic considerations to this area of evidence.
Section III sketches out the contours of a paternalistic argument
developed by Alvin Goldman and others writing in the tradition of
“naturalized epistemology,” an epistemology that builds on and takes
its direction from empirical observations about how we know things.
From this perspective, if paternalism is to justify exclusionary rules,
15

See Leslie A. Lunney, Protecting Juries From Themselves: Restricting the Admission of
Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Cases, 48 SMU L. REV. 103 (1994).
16
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd., v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
17
Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,
15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 54 (1901).
18
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149.
19
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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paternalism itself must be justified by an appeal to empirical evidence
that informs us about the ability of actors in an institution to convey
and understand information. Building on this discussion, Section IV
assesses the available empirical research on these topics and
concludes with a brief discussion of the relationship between
admissibility rules and the ends of justice. Section V summarizes the
existing evidence for a paternalistic approach, suggests some
considerations courts should bring to the admissibility task, and
briefly discusses other procedural justice concerns that may argue for
the admissibility of evidence, even if this would reduce the overall
accuracy of verdicts.
II. RULES CONCERNING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Kuhn is a counter-revolutionary opinion. It runs against the tide
of heightened judicial scrutiny of expert testimony that is associated
with the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Daubert v. Merrell
20
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Indeed, Daubert is often said to have
21
ushered in the “Daubert revolution.” In this Section, I provide a
short review of the law with respect to admissibility of scientific
evidence before and after Daubert.
22
Kansas is one of a substantial number of states that still follows
23
the admissibility rule first adopted in Frye v. United States. In Frye, the
defendant, accused of murder, offered the results of a “systolic blood
pressure deception test,” a precursor to the polygraph, as evidence of
his innocence. Prior to Frye, most courts only asked whether the
expert was “qualified” before admitting the expert’s testimony and, in
some jurisdictions, whether the subject matter in issue was beyond
24
the range of knowledge of the average juror.
However, Frye’s
20

Id. The literature on Daubert is voluminous. For a discussion of the ruling and
its increasingly wide reach, see DAVID FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE:
THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ch. 1 (2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter FAIGMAN
ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE].
21
See David L Faigman, The Law’s Scientific Revolution: Reflections and Ruminations
on the Law’s Use of Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 661
(2000).
22
See David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the
General Acceptance Test, 4 JURIMETRICS J. 385, 386 (2001); see also Heather G. Hamilton,
The Movement from Frye to Daubert: Where Do the States Stand?, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 201
(1999); Jolle Anne Moreno, Eyes Wide Shut: Hidden Problems and Future Consequences of
the Fact-Based Reliability Standard, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. __ (forthcoming in Fall
2003).
23
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). My discussion here borrows heavily from
FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 20, at ch. 1.
24
FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 20, at ch. 1. For a
general historical overview of the use of expert testimony, see Stephan Landsman, Of
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expert’s testimony posed special problems because he proposed to
testify to a novel technique that was not currently being used by a
community of experts. In a brief two-page opinion, Judge Van Orsdel
placed an additional hurdle in the path of those who would
introduce expert testimony. The key passage established what has
25
come to be called the “general acceptance test.” Expert testimony is
admissible when the scientific principle or technique from which it is
deduced has gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.
With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the 1970s,
the Frye test began a slow decline in the federal courts. While new
theories and techniques gained general acceptance, the Frye test was
criticized for being too conservative because it imposed a waiting
26
period. In addition, others criticized the test as too liberal because
of the difficulty of defining the relevant field within which general
acceptance must be achieved. If the field is narrowly defined to
include the proffered expert and other like-minded individuals, little
27
will be excluded.
These criticisms and the fact that the reporter’s notes
accompanying the Federal Rules of Evidence did not even mention
the case when discussing the admissibility of expert testimony caused
28
a number of federal circuits to abandon the test. Other circuits,
Witches, Madmen, and Products Liability: An Historical Survey of the Use of Expert Testimony,
13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 131 (1995). See also David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal
Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and
Worrying About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1803-09
(1994). The classic exploration of this historical question is Hand, supra note 17.
25
The court in Frye held that:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made
must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs.
Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
26
For a case praising the conservative nature of Frye, see People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d
321, 325 (Cal. 1994).
27
See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980).
28
The most influential early circuit court opinion rejecting Frye is United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). In a case involving expert testimony on
eyewitness identification, Judge Becker said that in order to be admitted the
evidence must survive the trial court’s preliminary inquiry. In an in limine
proceeding, the judge should balance: (1) the reliability of the scientific principles
the expert employed against (2) the likelihood that the evidence may overwhelm or
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however, concluded Frye did survive the adoption of the Rules.
30
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme
Court officially ended the debate. In a case involving the morning
sickness drug Bendectin, the Court concluded that Frye’s rigid
“general acceptance” standard is contrary to the thrust of the Federal
Rules, which were intended to lower the barriers to expert opinion
31
testimony. However, Daubert agreed that Federal Rule of Evidence
702 does modify Rule 402’s directive to admit all relevant evidence.
Rule 702 also requires reliability; evidence which is relevant but
32
unreliable is inadmissible.
What constitutes reliability? In this case, where all the experts
purported to be scientists, the Court turned to science for an answer.
Reliable opinions are those that are arrived at using the “methods
33
and procedures of science.” In a footnote, the Court added, “[i]n a
case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based
34
upon scientific validity.”
Daubert did not offer a systematic presentation of what scientists
mean when they inquire about validity, but it did propose the
following four non-exclusive factors courts might consider when
making a reliability/validity assessment: 1) whether the expert’s
35
theory or technique is falsifiable and has been tested; 2) the
36
reliability of a procedure and its potential rate of error; 3) whether
37
the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
38
whether the results have been published; and 4) in a partial
resurrection of the Frye test, whether the expert’s methods and
reasoning enjoy general acceptance in a relevant scientific
39
community.

mislead the jury. In addition, the trial court should examine the “fit” between the
proffered scientific testimony and the contested issues in the case. Id. at 1226.
Concern with reliability and fit have become cornerstones of post-Daubert
jurisprudence. The Fifth Circuit, in Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., set out a
similar test for admissibility. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106
(5th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 912 (1992).
29
United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522, 1526 (9th Cir. 1985).
30
509 U.S. 579.
31
Id. at 588.
32
Id. at 590.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 590 n.9.
35
Id. at 593.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 593-94.
39
Id. at 594.
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In addition, the Court noted that Rule 702 requires that the
expert evidence “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
40
to determine a fact in issue.” Justice Blackmun stated that,
[t]his condition goes primarily to relevance . . . [t]he
consideration has been aptly described by Judge Becker as one of
“fit.” “Fit” is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one
purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated
41
purposes.

The “fit” requirement involves an assessment of whether the expert’s
42
chain of reasoning contains an inferential gap that is too wide.
In another footnote, the Court expressly limited Daubert to
scientific evidence. It noted that Rule 702 applies to “technical or
other specialized knowledge” as well, but added, “[o]ur discussion is
limited to the scientific context because that is the nature of the
43
expertise offered here.” Daubert left two related questions for later
cases to answer: 1) does Daubert’s reliability requirement apply at all
to non-scientific evidence; and 2) if it does apply, what role do the
Daubert factors play in these cases? These questions frequently arose
with respect to the admissibility of clinical medical testimony similar

40

Id.
Id. at 591 (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir.
1985)).
42
Courts may find a lack of fit when the studies presented by the expert simply
fail to support the expert’s position. Using the “fit” requirement in this way causes
courts to move close to excluding an expert’s testimony because of the expert’s
conclusion. This is something the Supreme Court in Daubert specifically cautioned
against when it said that the focus of the 702 validity inquiry “must be solely on
principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Daubert,
509 U.S. at 595.
Most appellate courts downplayed the Supreme Court’s methodologyconclusion distinction. For example, in Paoli, an opinion following Daubert, Judge
Becker himself stated “we think that [the distinction between principles and methods
versus conclusions] has only limited practical import . . . a challenge to ‘fit’ is very
close to a challenge to the expert’s ultimate conclusion about the particular case,
and yet it is part of the judge’s admissibility calculus under Daubert.” In re Paoli, 35
F.3d 717, 746 (3d Cir. 1994).
In General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), the Supreme Court ratified
Judge Becker’s view:
[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a
district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing
data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that
there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the
opinion proffered. That is what the District Court did here and we
hold that it did not abuse its discretion in so doing.
522 U.S. at 146.
43
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8.
41
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44

to the testimony in Kuhn and other types of “experience”
45
testimony.
The Supreme Court answered these two questions in Kumho Tire
46
Co. v. Carmichael. The plaintiffs’ expert in Kumho Tire was prepared
to testify that the tire failure, which led to the crash of the plantiffs’
minivan, was the result of a manufacturing or design defect, not a
result of abuse. The trial court excluded this testimony after finding
that “none of the four admissibility criteria outlined by the Daubert
47
court are satisfied in this case.” Because the expert testimony was
the plaintiff’s only evidence of defect, the district court judge then
48
granted the defendant’s summary judgment motion. The plaintiffs
appealed, arguing that the district court should not have applied
Daubert’s reliability framework because the case did not involve a
49
“scientific” expert.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit agreed that Daubert applied only to scientific
testimony. Whether the expert’s testimony was or was not scientific
would have little consequence if the court invoked uniformly
stringent admissibility criteria. The circuit court did assert that it was
prepared to affirm a well-reasoned trial court decision to exclude the
plaintiffs’ expert’s testimony on reliability grounds if, upon remand,
50
the trial court did so without invoking the Daubert criteria. However,
in another part of the opinion, the circuit court said, “[t]hus, the
question in this case is whether Carlson’s testimony is based on his
application of scientific principles or theories [which we should
submit to a Daubert analysis] or on his utilization of personal

44

See, e.g., Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 126 F.3d 679 (5th Cir. 1997), vacated,
151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
45
See, e.g., Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc., 82 F.3d. 1513 (10th Cir. 1996).
“The language in Daubert makes it clear the factors outlined by the Court are
applicable only when a proffered expert relied on some principle or methodology.
In other words, application of the Daubert factors is unwarranted in cases where
expert testimony is based solely upon experience or training.” Id. at 1518. But see
Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t seems exactly
backwards that experts who purport to rely on general engineering principles and
practical experience might escape screening by the district court simply by stating
that their conclusions were not reached by any particular method or technique. The
moral of this approach would be, the less factual support for an expert’s opinion, the
better.”).
46
526 U.S. 137 (1999). In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), the
Court concluded, inter alia, that trial courts’ 702 rulings should be reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard.
47
Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1414, 1521 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
48
Id. at 1524.
49
Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1435 (11th Cir. 1997).
50
Id. at 1436 n.9.
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experience and skill with failed tires [which we would usually expect a
51
district court to allow a jury to evaluate].” This suggests a more
lenient admissibility standard for non-science experts and echoes the
Kuhn court’s position that expert experience evidence should rarely
be kept from juries.
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and held that
52
excluding Carlson’s testimony was not an abuse of discretion. The
53
reliability requirement of Rule 702 applies to all expert testimony.
As to the role of the four Daubert factors, the court adopted a flexible
position:
We also conclude that a trial court may consider one or more of
the more specific factors that Daubert mentioned when doing so
will help determine that testimony’s reliability. But, as the Court
stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is “flexible,” and Daubert’s
list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to
all experts or in every case. Rather, the law grants a district court
the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine
reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability
54
determination.

It would be a mistake to read Kumho Tire to say that the trial

51

Id. at 1436.
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 137.
53
The Court provides four reasons why Daubert’s general reliability requirement
applies to all expert testimony. First, the language of Rule 702 makes no relevant
distinction between “scientific” knowledge and “technical” or “other specialized”
knowledge. Second, although the Daubert opinion did restrict itself to “scientific”
knowledge, that was only because the issue presented in the case involved scientific
expertise.
Third, the evidentiary rationale that underlies the gatekeeping
requirement is that Rules 702 and 703 give wide latitude to all experts to offer their
opinions, latitude that is unavailable to other witnesses. This latitude is premised on
the “assumption that the expert’s opinion will have a reliable basis in the knowledge
and experience of his discipline.” 526 U.S. 137, 147 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at
589). Because the Rules grant this latitude to all experts, they all must meet the
reliability standard. Fourth, a rule that distinguishes between scientific experts and
other experts would be very difficult if not impossible to administer.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 now has been revised to incorporate the main
components of Daubert and Kumho Tire. Amended Rule 702 provides as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2)
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702 (as modified Dec. 1, 2000).
54
526 U.S. at 141-42.
52
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court may simply ignore the Daubert factors in non-science cases.
The Court noted that “a trial court should consider the specific
factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of
56
the reliability of expert testimony.”
Implicit in the Kumho Tire
opinion is the belief that the justifications for restricting expert
testimony are as valid when expertise is based on experience as when
it is based on science, a point with which the Kansas Supreme Court
presumably would disagree.
Because there are many differences between the old Frye test and
the Daubert-Kumho Tire line of cases, it is easy to lose sight of the fact
that, when compared to an opinion like Kuhn, they share much in
common. Both the Frye approach and that of Daubert ask the judge to
exclude relevant evidence if it is unreliable. They differ in how to
assess reliability and, perhaps, the height of the reliability hurdle over
which the expert must jump.
One justification for the reliability requirements is paternalistic.
Restrictions on the admissibility of expert evidence shelter jurors
from their own shortcomings. Absent such rules, jurors will be more
likely to reach an incorrect conclusion. The Kuhn opinion is
instructive precisely because it rejects the paternalistic justification for
reliability standards.
III. PATERNALISTIC JUSTIFICATIONS IN LAW

Paternalistic arguments are not restricted to the law of evidence.
To the contrary, they are staples of law. The state frequently
constrains behavior on paternalistic grounds. Laws, which dispense
food stamps rather than cash, forbid gambling, regulate interest
rates, bar dueling, and make suicide a crime, along with the
Eighteenth Amendment were all designed to prevent people from
acting in ways contrary to what others think are against their own self
57
interest. Of course, paternalistic arguments do not always prevail.
Other considerations may cause us to reject them either because we
think they are misplaced—that people will act in their own best
interest—or because of other considerations that outweigh the force
of paternalistic considerations. The pull of different considerations
55

See Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 311-12 (5th Cir. 1999) (“In the vast
majority of cases, the district court first should decide whether the factors mentioned
in Daubert are appropriate. Once it considers the Daubert factors, the court then can
consider whether other factors, not mentioned in Daubert, are relevant to the case at
hand.”).
56
526 U.S. at 152.
57
Much of this list comes from Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 19,
20 (Rolf Satorius ed., 1983).
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can be seen in one high-profile area: Supreme Court opinions
58
concerning restrictions on commercial speech.
A. Paternalism in Speech Cases
Paternalistic arguments frequently arise in discussions regarding
restrictions on commercial speech. Typically, the legislature justifies
restrictive enactments by arguing, inter alia, that the consumers of
some messages would be better off without the communication
because the information contained in the message would cause them
to act against their own best interest and also, perhaps, against the
best interests of the community. As Justice Thomas noted in his
concurring opinion in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn. v. United
59
States, the primary governmental justification for such restrictions
are paternalistic; that is they are designed “to keep legal users of a
product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in
60
the marketplace.”
First Amendment free speech jurisprudence is an area where
anti-paternalistic instincts are perhaps the strongest. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court generally rejects these
61
justifications.
In the area of commercial speech, however, such
62
arguments have not met with universal failure.
58

Paternalistic arguments also arise with respect to restrictions on obscenity, hate
speech, and speech directed toward minors. See, e.g., Catherine J. Ross, Anything
Goes: Examining the State’s Interest in Protecting Children From Controversial Speech, 53
VAND. L. REV. 427, 495 (2000).
59
527 U.S. 173.
60
Id. at 197.
61
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189, 231-33 (1983); see also David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism,
74 VA. L. REV 519, 543 (1988); Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What’s
Good For General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 235, 267 (1998).
62
Anti-paternalism was an important rationale in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), a 1976 opinion often
cited as the beginning of the court’s renewed interest in protecting commercial
speech. The Court expressly critiqued the paternalistic justifications offered by
Virginia for restricting price advertising of prescription drugs. Id. at 769-70. On the
other hand, the Court adopted a more paternalistic position in Posadas de Puerto Rico
Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986), permitting the government to restrict
casino advertizing addressed to Puerto Rican citizens. Then, in Florida Bar v. Went For
It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995), the Court exhibited some sympathy toward a
paternalistic argument for a bar association rule prohibiting lawyers from using
direct mail to solicit personal injury clients within thirty days of an accident. More
recently, however, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), the
Court rejected Rhode Island’s restriction on alcoholic beverage price advertising that
the state defended on the ground that it was designed to promote temperance by
reducing the consumption of alcohol by its citizens. In the process it rejected the
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Why have paternalistic arguments in this area been more central
to, and met with slightly greater success, than in other areas of First
Amendment jurisprudence? Professor Daniel Halberstam argues that
the centrality of paternalistic arguments in the commercial speech
arena is due to a basic difference between these cases and other First
63
Amendment opinions. Most First Amendment doctrine focuses on
preserving the ability of speakers to communicate their views, but
“commercial speech doctrine disclaims significant reliance on the
64
speaker-based model, and instead focuses on the listener.”
This
“focus on the listener” reflects the fact that this area of First
Amendment law does not view communicative interactions “as
abstract exchanges of views between persons about whom nothing is
known, but instead, as context-dependent interactions with purposes
that can be judicially ascertained with a reasonable degree of
65
confidence.”
Professor Halberstam argues that we should assess
argument advanced in Posadas that restrictions should be given more leeway if they
regulate “vice” activities from which the state has a particularly strong interest in
shielding its citizens. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 514. This position was reaffirmed in
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn. v. United States, 27 U.S. 173 (1999), where the
Court held that a prohibition on broadcasting lottery information could not be
applied to advertisements of lawful private casino gambling that were broadcast
where such gambling is legal. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001),
the Court struck down Massachusetts’ restrictions on outdoor and point of sale
advertising of tobacco products. In Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357
(2002), the Court struck down an advertising restriction on compound drugs. The
government’s justification for the restriction was not based on paternalistic
arguments, however. 535 U.S. at 370.
44 Liquormart, Greater New Orleans, and Reilly have generated the usual volume of
law review commentary both about these cases and their implication for related
issues such as professional speech, restrictions on tobacco advertising, advertising
prescription drugs, and ads extolling the beneficial effects of alcohol consumption.
See Sean P. Costello, Strange Brew: The State of Commercial Speech Jurisprudence Before and
After 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 681 (1997); see also
Arlen W. Langvardt, The Incremental Strengthening of First Amendment Protection for
Commercial Speech: Lessons from Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 587
(2000); Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional
Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771 (1999); Nat Stern, In Defense of the
Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55 (1999); Martin H. Redish,
Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 589 (1996); Margaret
Gilhooley, Constitutionalizing Food and Drug Law, 74 TULANE L. REV. 815 (2000);
Nancy K. Plant, Prescription Drug Promotion on the Internet: Tool for the Inquisitive or Trap
for the Unwary?, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 89 (1998); Erik Bierbauer, Liquid Honesty: The
First Amendment Right to Market the Health Benefits of Moderate Alcohol Consumption, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1057 (1999); Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the
Constitutional Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at “The Greater Includes the Lesser,” 55
VAND. L. REV. 693 (2002).
63
See Halberstam, supra note 62.
64
Id. at 831.
65
Id. at 830.
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restrictions on commercial speech in terms of whether they sustain or
improve the integrity of communication in the buyer-seller
66
relationship. Using this qualitative approach, he would approve of
the position set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
67
Service Commission, that speech restrictions prohibiting false or
deceptive advertising are permissible because they impede
68
communication between a buyer and seller.
More difficult are the situations where the speech is not
misleading, and where it could not be said that a perfectly rational
and fully-informed consumer would be unable to assess the
information and give it the attention it deserved. Ultimately,
restrictions in this situation must search for their justification in
69
alleged listener shortcomings.
I find that I am in general agreement with the Halberstam
position. Restrictions on paternalistic grounds are most easily
justified within the context of a specific set of communications
directed at a defined purpose where parties play defined roles.
B. Paternalism in Evidence Law
When a case is tried to a jury, jurors, litigants, and judges play
roles not unlike the role of consumer, advertiser, and government in
commercial speech cases. When the parties to the litigation wish to
communicate their message to jurors, judges are asked to limit or
restrict what the speaker should be permitted to say. These
limitations are justified in part by the legal system’s assessment of the
capacity of the jury, and what will be best for them with respect to the
70
evidence they receive.
66

Id. at 866.
447 U.S. 557 (1980). Central Hudson involved a challenge to a New York agency
regulation that barred utilities from advertising to promote the use of electricity. It
remains the most completely articulated constitutional test for commercial speech.
Part one of the four part Hudson test is whether the affected speech is nonmisleading and concerns a lawful activity. If it fails on either prong, it receives no
First Amendment protection. Id. at 563, 566, n.9. When speech passes this
threshold, the next three parts of the Hudson test come into play. Together, they
require the government to show a substantial interest to be served by its restriction
on commercial speech (part two), the restriction directly advances the underlying
government interest (part three), and is no more extensive than necessary to further
it (part four). Id. at 563-64, 566; see also Langvardt, supra note 62, at 599-601.
68
Halberstam, supra note 62, at 857.
69
See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 334, 335 (1991).
70
There are, of course, many differences between restrictions of commercial
speech and restrictions of testimony. One might note, for example, that rarely does
the judge act on her own. Rather, restrictions only occur when the opposing party
67
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This raises the question of how to determine what is best, or to
put the question a different way, “best” with what end in view? Here
one must make a fundamental choice. If the reader disagrees with
the next paragraph, he or she may question much of what follows. I
return to this point in Section IV.
The primary goal in the view of the law of evidence, and of the
trial itself, is to uncover the truth. Ronald Allen and Brian Leiter
argue:
it is striking and important that the vast majority of the rules of
evidence have as their primary rationale their (alleged) truthconductive virtues. Competency of witnesses, authentication of
evidence, relevancy, expert testimony, and hearsay (including the
exceptions) all, at bottom, rest on the thought that inclusion and
exclusion of evidence in line with these rules will increase the
71
frequency with which truth is ascertained.

Other non-evidentiary rules governing jury behavior appear to be
motivated by the same consideration. These rules include, for
example, the prohibition of note-taking and pre-deliberation
72
discussion of the case by the jury.
If ascertaining the truth is the primary goal of a trial, a central
question becomes what evidence should one consider in order to
maximize the likelihood of arriving at a correct answer? Alvin
Goldman notes that, in the philosophy of science, a popular

asks for them. In this sense the judge may be more passive than the legislature. We
should not overemphasize this distinction, however. It is rare for either courts or
legislatures to act sua sponte.
71
Ronald Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87
VA. L. REV. 1491, 1501 (2001).
More formally, Federal Rule of Evidence section 102 lists the ascertainment of
truth as one of the Rules’ primary objectives:
Rule 102. Purpose and Construction:
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
FED. R. EVID. 102. As the rule suggests, however, ascertaining the truth is not the sole
objective of the rules.
Commentators vary widely in the belief that the search for truth is the primary
goal of trials or the primary function of the jury. Compare Franklin Strier, Making Jury
Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95 (1996), with Mark Cammack, In Search of
the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 405 (1995). In addition, see Edward J.
Imwinkelried, The Worst Evidence Principle: The Best Hypothesis as to the Logical Structure
of Evidence Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1069, 1070 (1992), for a useful discussion of “jury
control” and “best evidence” explanations of the structure of evidence law.
72
See Joseph Sanders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of
Adversarial Processes, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 355, 385 (1998).
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epistemological answer to this question is that an individual should
base his judgments and subjective probabilities on the total evidence
available. Therefore, when confronted with a decision, individuals
should use all available evidence that can be collected and used at a
73
74
reasonable cost. He calls this the “requirement of total evidence.”
When the evidence that might be made available to the individual is
under the control of another, a corollary of this requirement is that
the other person should make available to the individual all of the
evidence relevant to the question at hand. Goldman calls this the
75
control version of the requirement of total evidence. In the present
context, this control version argues that judges should not impose
admissibility rules that keep relevant, but relatively unreliable,
76
evidence from juries.
Goldman argues, however, that the legal system’s failure to
adopt a control version of the requirement of total evidence is not
necessarily unwise, because such a rule may not produce the most
accurate results if jurors give too much weight to relatively unreliable
77
evidence.
To the degree this is so, an admissibility rule that
excludes such evidence may be justified on the grounds of what
Goldman calls “epistemic paternalism.” “The general idea is that the
indicated rules of evidence are designed to protect jurors from their
own ‘folly,’ just as parents might keep dangerous toys or other articles
78
away from children, or might not expose them to certain facts.” For
example, Rule 403 permits the exclusion of evidence that is relevant
if its “probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

73

Alvin Goldman, Epistemic Paternalism: Communication Control in Law and Society,
88 J. OF PHILOSOPHY 113 (1991).
74
For a justification of this rule, see PAUL HORWICH, PROBABILITY AND EVIDENCE
(1982). Goldman notes that there may be a number of non-epistemological grounds
for excluding some evidence, for example, if collecting the evidence invades the
privacy rights of some individual. Goldman, supra note 73, at 114.
75
Goldman, supra note 73, at 114. Again, Goldman notes there may be many
non-epistemic reasons for excluding testimony, for example, that it is the result of an
illegal search and seizure.
76
Evidence that is completely unreliable is, by definition, irrelevant. That is, it
cannot alter the probability that some fact is more or less likely. An evidentiary
restriction that admits only relevant evidence does not, therefore, violate the
requirement of total evidence as it is ordinarily understood. See Goldman, supra note
73, at 113 n.2.
77
See Richard Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (1977).
78
Goldman, supra note 73, at 118. Specific empirical examples of situations
where restricting information to jurors lead to more accurate conclusions are rare.
But see Dale Nance & Scott Morris, An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for
Trace Evidence With a Relatively Large and Quantifiable Random Match Probability, 42
JURIMETRICS J. 403, 442-44 (2002).
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unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” As
Brian Leiter describes the issue:
Epistemic paternalism substitutes the rulemaker’s judgment
about what is epistemically best for agents for their own
judgment. Assuming that the primary epistemic value is truth,
epistemic paternalism entails designing rules of evidence that are
epistemically best for jurors, i.e. that lead them to form true
79
beliefs about disputed matters of fact.

Goldman admits that a paternalistic concern for the “welfare” of
jurors is a bit odd. If we focus solely on the well-being of jurors
themselves, the paternalistic impulses in the law of evidence seem
almost trivial. Paternalism is generally thought of as an intervention
in a person’s freedom aimed at furthering his own good. The good
to be achieved here, however, is not central to the well-being of the
individual juror. Indeed, one might say that the intervention is not
paternalistic at all, if by the term we only mean that the court is
operating in a manner contrary to the jury’s preferences. It might
well be that were we to ask jurors many would say, “Sure, keep the
unreliable evidence from me. I do not choose to be bothered by it.”
However, Donald VanDeVeer proposes a second definition of
paternalistic behavior that, comes closer to describing what courts do,
and closer to what legislatures say they are doing when they restrict
commercial speech. By this definition, an act is also paternalistic
when one deliberately acts to shape another’s preferences in ways
80
that bypass the other’s capacity to resist.
Keeping people from
information that they never knew to exist may be paternalistic in this
sense. Moreover, the apparently trivial nature of admissibility
81
paternalism disappears if we agree with Gerald Dworkin and John
82
Kleinig that paternalism exists even when the class of persons whose
good is involved is not the same as the class of persons whose
freedom is restricted. Requiring medical doctors to be licensed or
restricting the ability of individuals to obtain drugs without a
prescription are paternalistic in this sense. They are designed not to
protect physicians or drug manufacturers, rather they are intended to
83
protect consumers.
Admissibility restrictions that are justified
79

Brian Leiter, The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science
Would Not Make For Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REV. 803, 814 (1997).
80
DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION: THE MORAL BOUNDS ON
BENEVOLENCE 19 (1986).
81
Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107, 110 (Richard A.
Wassertrom ed., 1971).
82
JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM 11 (1983).
83
Dworkin calls these examples of “impure” paternalism. Dworkin, supra note
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because they are best for the parties to the litigation, or for the legal
84
system itself, are paternalistic in the same way.
Thus far, the issues have been presented as if they simply involve
the ability of individual jurors.
However, the acquisition of
knowledge has a social as well as an individual dimension. As Alvin
Goldman notes, we should be concerned not only with individual
knowers but also with the social processes and practices which
85
inculcate belief.
The individual ability of the juror must be
understood within the context of the trial and the way in which
evidence is typically presented to the factfinder. From this wider
perspective, Goldman suggests five factors when considering the
effect of paternalistic rules on decisions, that are relevant to whether
paternalistic communication control policies will lead to veritistic
86
outcomes.
They are as follows: 1) the characteristics of the
audience; 2) the characteristics of the speakers; 3) the characteristics
of the controller (or gatekeeper); 4) the controller’s criterion of
selection among speakers or messages; and 5) the availability of other
87
alternate channels of communication that address the same topic.
It is a relatively straightforward undertaking to apply Goldman’s
factors to the admissibility of expert testimony. For example, a
number of Goldman’s considerations relate to arguments advanced
in Kuhn. Characteristics of the audience (jurors) and the speakers
(the experts) relate to Kuhn’s first three arguments: 1) jurors are
relatively unconfused by expert testimony that does not involve a
“technique” such as a lie detector; 2) jurors are less confused by
testimony based on an expert’s own investigations than they are by
testimony based on the investigations of other researchers; and 3)
jurors are less confused by inductive reasoning than by deductive
reasoning. Characteristics of the controller (the judge), and the

81, at 22.
84
Goldman, supra note 73, at 119.
85
ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD 4-5 (1999). Goldman is a
leading advocate of “naturalized epistemology,” an approach to knowledge that
wishes to craft norms to guide our acquisition of knowledge based in large part on
empirical information about how the human cognitive apparatus works. His
perspective has a strong social dimension. Social epistemology focuses on social
paths or routes to knowledge, examines the spread of information (or
misinformation) across groups, and may consider collective or corporate entities
such as juries or legislatures to be the relevant unit of analysis. The core
commitment of naturalized epistemology is methodological: an examination of the
social mechanisms and practices that inculcate belief. See Allen & Leiter, supra note
71.
86
Goldman, supra note 73, at 124.
87
Id. I have rearranged the order in which Goldman discusses the variables.
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controller’s criterion of selection, relate to Kuhn’s fourth argument:
judges are no better than jurors in assessing the merits of a scientific
argument. The availability of alternative channels touches on Kuhn’s
fifth argument: cross-examination, competing experts, and judicial
instructions are adequate to the task of clearing up any residual jury
confusion.
The Kuhn opinion cites no research as authority for its assertion
about the abilities of judges and juries. In this regard, however, Kuhn
is no different from most opinions. The next Section discusses what
evidence we have in support of Kuhn’s view, or the opposite view that
restrictions on the admissibility of expert evidence may improve
outcome accuracy.
The reader should be warned, however, that the existing
research rarely addresses the exact questions for which we need
answers. There is no research that addresses the ultimate question of
whether, in the aggregate, cases are more frequently decided
correctly under various admissibility regimes. This does not mean
the research results are irrelevant, for even if they do not answer the
ultimate question, they do narrow the range of reasonable
disagreement.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE RELATING TO PATERNALISTIC ARGUMENTS
Although there are many ways one might organize the research
relevant to the paternalistic argument, this article employs Goldman’s
88
five factors as a template.
A. The Characteristics of the Audience
The heart of the argument for restrictions turns on the
characteristics of the audience, that is the jurors. As Goldman and
others recognize, these characteristics are shaped not only by
qualities that individuals bring to the courthouse, e.g. their
educational attainment, demographic characteristics, and life
experiences, but also by the forum itself. They are not simply a set of
individuals, rather they are a jury. As a jury, they are constrained in
many ways. They cannot go to the library at night to do independent
reading on a topic in the trial. They cannot ask the parties for a
standard textbook that they might examine. In most jurisdictions,
they cannot even ask for clarification of ambiguous points. As Mirjan
Damaska notes “jurors have no proof initiative and are usually not
even permitted to ask questions of witnesses. While evidence is being
88

Id. at 124. I have rearranged the order in which Goldman discusses the factors.
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adduced, they sit silent, cast—one might say—into the role of potted
89
courtroom plants.” Therefore, while research on the abilities of
90
individuals is of some relevance,
better evidence on the
characteristics of the audience must come from research about
91
people placed in the role of a juror.
If there is one universal finding in jury research, it is that juries
take their job very seriously. If they fail to arrive at appropriate
92
results, normally it is not due to a lack of effort. Shortcomings,
therefore, are best thought of as caused by some combination of lack
of ability among jury members and by the way in which the jury
receives information.
93
The literature on jury performance in general is voluminous. I
focus on articles that at least tangentially touch on issues related to
expert witnesses. In this regard, it may be helpful to break the
89

MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 90 (1997). Recent efforts in Arizona
and elsewhere to empower jurors are slowly changing this pattern. See Nancy
Marder, Juries and Technology: Equipping Jurors for the Twenty-First Century, 66 BROOK. L.
REV. 1257 (2001); see also Paula L. Hanaford et al., Permitting Jury Discussions During
Trial: Impact of the Arizona Reform, 24 L. & HUMAN. BEHAV. 359 (2000); Larry Heuer &
Steven Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, 18 L. & HUMAN
BEHAV. 121 (1994).
90
In the survey context, the public often expresses views contrary to those held
by experts. For an example of this phenomenon, see Nancy Kraus et al., Intuitive
Toxicology: Expert and Lay Judgments of Chemical Risk, 12 RISK ANALYSIS 215 (1992),
reporting on expert and lay opinions regarding a number of matters concerning risk.
One question asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the
following statement:
Residents of a small community (30,000 people) observed that several
malformed children had been born there during each of the past few
years. The town is in a region where agricultural pesticides have been
used during the past decade. It is very likely that these pesticides were
the cause of the malformations?
Id. at 221. The results were as follows: among toxicologists only 5% agreed, while
48% of lay people agreed. Id.
91
Even within the area of jury research, there is wide variation in the quality of a
study design. Most jury research is done in the laboratory and ranges from full
blown trial simulations to paper and pencil exercises conducted with college
sophomore subjects. Generally, the more realistic the simulation the more faith we
may have that it captures the actual jury experience and, therefore, suffers from
fewer external validity threats.
92
Exceptions to this rule include the very short deliberation of the jury in the
O.J. Simpson criminal trial.
93
For useful discussions of jury research, see Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black
Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us about Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT:
ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 137, 152 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Michael J. Saks,
What do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1998); Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An
Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849 (1998); NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW
JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS (2000).
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research into two parts: first, the ability of juries to deal with complex
cases; and second, juries’ ability to assess expert testimony
uninfluenced by other, non-epistemic factors that might affect
94
judgment.
1. The Jury and Complex Cases
Evidence suggests that, while juries are competent in sorting out
95
facts in simple cases, their ability in more complex cases is open to
96
question. Complexity may arise due to the difficulty of the issues
being considered, or due to the sheer volume of information the jury
97
is asked to consider. Both types of complexity appear to give juries
difficulty.
Laboratory research reveals that mock jurors have trouble with
statistical and probabilistic evidence and tend to underutilize
98
statistical information in the sense that they fail to weigh it properly.

94

These issues overlap in actual trials. Cases which present complex factual
questions inevitably are cases with expert witness testimony.
95
REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983); see also Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are
Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 217-18 (1989);
Vidmar, supra note 93, at 853-54.
96
See Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons From Civil
Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 750-64 (1991); see also Richard Lempert, Civil Juries
and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY
SYSTEM 181 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL 117-30
(1998).
97
The shear volume of information may make a case complex, or at least
complicated. A second dimension of complexity is the technical difficulty of the
evidence. The most “complex” trials are those that contain large quantities of
various types of technical and scientific evidence. However, even short trials that
contain substantial amounts of technical, scientific, or statistical evidence may be
difficult for lay persons. Indeed, in such situations, a trial may be too short to convey
a full understanding of the evidence. Irwin Horowitz et al., The Effects of Complexity on
Jurors’ Verdicts and Construction of Evidence, 86 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 641, 649 (2001),
found that information load (the number of facts in the case) adversely affected
simulated juries’ ability to sort out those facts having the greatest probative value.
98
See David L Faigman & A.J. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes’ Theorem in the Trial Process:
Instructing Jurors on the Value of Statistical Evidence, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1988); see
also Brian C. Smith et al., Jurors’ Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 49
(1996); Thompson & Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials,
11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1987); William C. Thompson, Are Juries Competent to
Evaluate Statistical Evidence?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1989); Jane Goodman,
Juror’s Comprehension and Assessment of Probabilistic Evidence, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 361
(1992); Jonathan Koehler et al., The Random Match Probability in DNA Evidence:
Irrelevant and Prejudicial?, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 425 (1995); Jason Schklar & Shari S.
Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors and Expectations, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 159 (1999); Nance & Morris, supra note 78. In general, laypersons have
difficulty applying statistical concepts to everyday behavior. Richard Nisbett et al.,
Teaching Reasoning, 238 SCIENCE 625 (1987).
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For example, in one study by Jane Goodman, jurors were asked to
assess guilt of a defendant where his blood type was said to match that
found at the crime scene. Jurors in some versions of the experiment
99
were told the blood type matched 5% of the people in town. In
other versions, they were told it matched 1%, and in still other
versions 0.1%.
A control group was provided no frequency
100
information. The mean estimate of guilt was higher in groups that
heard the probabilistic evidence. However, the jurors’ estimates
“failed to make fine distinctions between probability estimates that
were mildly incriminating, moderately incriminating, and strongly
101
incriminating.”
Mock jurors with prior mathematical experience
gave more weight to this evidence, lending some credence to the idea
that juries comprised of more knowledgeable individuals, sometimes
102
called “blue-ribbon” juries, would do better in complex cases.
Molly Treadway Johnson conducted a set of experiments
examining the ability of members of a jury pool to make correct
causal judgments based on their understanding of fictitious
103
epidemiological studies. In one experiment, subjects were given a
pair of two-by-two tables presenting typical epidemiological findings.
In Table 1, there was a statistically significant association between
exposure and disease where the relative risk was 2.8—indicating that
if one is exposed, one has slightly less than three times as great a
chance of having the disease than if one is not exposed. In Table 2,
the relationship was not statistically significant, the relative risk was
1.01—indicating that if one is exposed one has a just slightly greater
chance of having the disease than if one is not exposed (if the relative
risk were 1.0, the likelihood of having the disease would be
unaffected by exposure). For each table, Johnson asked the
following two questions:
1) do the results of the study indicated that being exposed to
[substance x] increases a person’s risk of developing [a certain
abnormality], and 2) for any particular person who was exposed
to [substance x] and now has [the abnormality], is it more likely
than not that it was the [substance], rather than something else,
104
that caused the [abnormality]?

99

Goodman, supra note 98, at 361.
Id. at 369.
101
Id. at 372. In the 5% condition, the mean estimate of guilt was 40%, in the 1%
condition it was 45%, and in the 0.1% condition it was 47%. Id. at 371.
102
Id. at 389.
103
Molly T. Johnson, An Investigation of Juror Comprehension of Statistical Proof
of Causation (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation) (on file with author).
104
Id. at 51.
100
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Twenty-five respondents answered the question, so that there were a
total of 100 possible correct answers (two “yes’s” for the first table and
two “no’s” for the second table). Altogether, the respondents gave
forty-one correct answers; only two subjects answered all four
105
questions correctly.
In this experiment, the subjects were unassisted in their task. In
a second experiment, some subjects viewed an eighteen-minute
videotape of an epidemiologist explaining the tables and how
epidemiologists analyze and interpret epidemiological data followed
106
by jury instructions.
A control group heard only the instructions.
Surprisingly, subjects did about as well in this second experiment,
and there was no statistically significant difference in the frequency of
correct responses between the subjects who heard the expert
107
testimony and those who did not.
Johnson conducted a third experiment in which Experiment I
was replicated using college students rather than people from the
local jury pool as subjects. The college students did substantially
108
better.
Altogether, twenty-five college students gave sixty-four out
109
of a possible 100 correct answers.
Again, this result is consistent
with other research indicating that the quality of jury performance
depends, in part, on the abilities the jurors bring to their
deliberations. Both education and occupation are corollaries of juror
110
competence.
105

Id. at 54. All ambiguous answers, e.g. “maybe,” were coded as incorrect. Some
people might argue that the “correct” answer to the second question for each Table
is not obvious. If we only consider answers to the first question for each Table, then
out of fifty possible correct answers the respondents answered correctly twenty-three
times. Id. at 55. Generally, respondents tended to answer “No” and the distribution
of answers to the two Tables was nearly identical. Id. For Table 1 there were eight
“yeses,” fourteen “noes,” and three “others.” For Table 2 there were eight “yeses,”
fifteen “noes,” and two “others.” Id.
106
For an interesting study of how factors influence the odds that epidemiologists
themselves will draw a causal inference based on epidemiological research, see C.D.
Holman et al., A Psychometric Experiment in Causal Inference to Estimate Evidential Weights
Used by Epidemiologists, 12 EPIDEMIOLOGY 246 (2001). Factors with the strongest
influence include: level of statistical significance, refutation of alternative
explanations, strength of association, number of supporting studies, and information
concerning biological and theoretical coherence.
107
Id. at 80.
108
This result is consistent with research that indicates training in statistics or
economics improves statistical reasoning ability. See Richard Nisbett et al., Teaching
Reasoning, in RULES FOR REASONING (Richard Nisbett ed., 1993).
109
Johnson, supra note 103, at 94. With respect to the first question for each
table, the college students provided thirty-two out of fifty possible correct answers.
Id. at 96.
110
See Fred Strodtbeck et al., Social Status in Jury Deliberations, 22 AM. SOC. REV. 713
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It is important to note that the Johnson study did not involve a
deliberation, and there is evidence that if some members of the jury
are correct in their understanding of some piece of information they
will be able to communicate it to other jurors. On the other hand,
the Johnson study does suggest that evidence from a relatively simple
epidemiological study may be “complex” in the eyes of many jurors.
Irwin Horowitz, Lynn Forester Lee, and Ian Brolly examined
complexity in a setting where jury-eligible adults saw a videotape of a
111
complex civil trial.
The experiment varied both the information
load (the quantity of evidence to be processed) and the complexity
(comprehensibility), of the testimony of the witnesses. These two
dimensions paralleled the trial length and scientific complexity
dimensions of other studies.
Horowitz, et al. manipulated
information load by varying the number of plaintiffs and witnesses
who testified. They found that high information load negatively
affected juror evaluation of liability. Jurors were less able to
112
distinguish effectively among differentially liable plaintiffs.
The results of these experiments are substantiated by survey data
and by case studies of actual trials. Daniel Shuman, et al. sent
questionnaires to judges who presided over cases in which expert
witnesses testified. Only forty-seven percent rarely thought the expert
113
testimony was too technical for jurors to understand.
Self-reports
by jurors also indicate that some, but not all, jurors report having
trouble. A Federal Judicial Center study reports that forty-six percent
of jurors in long trials rated difficult or very difficult, although most
114
said that they were able to comprehend the evidence.
Steven Austin interviewed jurors in a complex predatory pricing
case under the Robinson-Patman Act. He reports that the jurors were
“overwhelmed, frustrated and, confused by testimony well beyond
115
their comprehension.”
Similarly, in another study, Steven
Friedland describes several complex cases in which juries

(1957); see also HASTIE ET AL., supra note 95.
111
Horowitz et al., supra note 97, at 757.
112
Id. at 764.
113
Daniel W. Shuman et al., An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert Witnesses in
the Courts–Part II: A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193, 198 (1994).
114
Cecil et al., supra note 96, at 751-53. The FJC research tends to equate
complexity with trial length.
115
Arthur Austin, The Jury System at Risk From Complexity, The New Media, and
Deviancy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 54 (1995). Relevant to the issue of central versus
peripheral processing discussed below, he noted that the jurors began to focus on
how the lawyers were dressed and other such matters.
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116

experienced comprehension problems.
The Special Committee on Jury Comprehension of the
American Bar Association’s (ABA) Litigation Section conducted an
in-depth study of jury decision-making in four complex cases where
117
complexity was a matter of both length and technical difficulty. In
some of the cases, the jury reported it was able to sort out the
evidence, but in others jurors told researchers they had trouble
118
deciding claims because of the large volume of data.
Richard Lempert provided a useful discussion of actual jury
behavior in complex cases based on a review of thirteen cases that
could be considered complex either because of length or subject
119
matter.
Lempert used a three-point “defensibility scale” (high,
moderate, and low) to rate each verdict on the merits. The
defensibility of the decision on the merits was rated as high in seven
116

Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases,
85 NW. U. L. REV. 190 (1990).
117
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON JURY COMPREHENSION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
SECTION OF LITIGATION, JURY COMPREHENSION IN COMPLEX CASES (1989) [hereinafter
SPECIAL COMMITTEE].
The cases involved antitrust, sexual harassment,
misappropriation of trade secrets, and insurance fraud. Id. at 9-23. Although the
researchers could not tape the actual jurors in the cases, they did tape simultaneous
alternate jury deliberations with the objective of gaining some insight into what
happened in the real jury deliberations. Unfortunately for the researchers, but
revealing in its own right, in three of the four cases the alternate jury reached a
different verdict than the actual jury. Id. at 59.
118
Id. at 25-26.
119
Lempert, supra note 96, at 181. Cases 1-4 were part of the ABA study: (1)
sexual harassment, (2) antitrust, (3) insurance fraud related to an arson, and (4)
misappropriation of trade secrets. The research was conducted by Elizabeth Loftus,
Jane Goodman, and Edith Green. Case 5 reports on the famous Pennzoil v. Texaco
case which involved a tortuous interference with contract. Stephen Adler, How to
Lose the Bet-Your-Company Case, AM. LAW. 27-30, 107-10 (Jan./Feb. 1986). Cases 6 and
7 are the trial and retrial of the antitrust case, Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric
Illuminating Co., studied by Austin. See ARTHUR AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION
CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY (1984). Cases 8-11 are reports of notable
trials in The American Lawyer by a number of different authors. Case 8, Stephen
Brill, Inside the DeLorean Jury Room, AM. LAW. 94-105. (Dec. 1984), reviews the criminal
conspiracy trial of John DeLorean. Case 9, Allison Frankel, He Bombed as a Stool
Pigeon, AM. LAW. 35-89. (May 1989), discusses United States v. GAF Corp., a stock
manipulation case. Case 10 Gay Jervey, Charlie Keating, Meet Your Peers, AM. LAW. 10109. (March 1992), reports on California v. Keating, the prosecution of Charles Keating
for stock fraud. Case 11, Mitchell Pacelle, Contaminated Verdict, AM. LAW. 75-80 (Dec.
1986), writes about a toxic tort case against W.R. Grace & Co and Beatrice Corp. for
leukemia allegedly caused by their dumping toxic substances that seeped into the
ground water used as drinking water by plaintiffs. Case 12 is a Rand report of an
asbestos case. MOLLY SELVIN & LARRY PINKUS, THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE:
OBSERVATIONS FROM A RECENT ASBESTOS CASE (1987). Case 13, Claudia Weinstein,
Losing Big in Computer Land, AM. LAW. 123-30 (Oct. 1983), discusses Micro/Vest v
Computerland Corp., a breach of contract case.
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cases, moderate in four cases, and low in two cases.
In an attempt to separate cases that are ““complex” because of
their subject matter, Lempert rates each case according to his own
sense of the inherent difficulty of the evidence, once again on a three
120
point scale: high, moderate, and low. Of the six cases scored low on
inherent difficulty, four juries reached highly-defensible verdicts and
two reached moderately-defensible verdicts. Of the seven trials rated
moderate or high on difficulty, three juries reached highly defensible
verdicts, two reached moderately defensible verdicts, and two scored
low on defensibility. The one jury for which the evidence difficulty
was rated high, but whose verdict on the merits was rated as highly
defensible, found damage amounts that Lempert rated low on
defensibility. Overall, one can conclude from this study that jury
performance is more likely to be a problem in those cases that are
“complex” because of the technical nature of the evidence.
I reached a similar conclusion after interviewing jurors about the
testimony in a complex evidence case involving the drug Bendectin.
I concluded that the jurors had a weak grasp of the science resulting
121
in an indefensible verdict.
These studies are consistent with the observation of Joe Cecil
and his colleagues, that the most difficult type of complex evidence is
122
that containing statistical and technical information. There is some
research to support the suggestion that the difficulty jurors have in
assigning appropriate weight to this evidence is exacerbated when the
evidence is of low probative value, that is when it does not change the
123
probability of a causal relationship by very much.

120

A case was scored high on difficulty “where a large amount of hard to
understand, unfamiliar scientific information bore on the central issue in the case.”
Lempart, supra note 119, at 189. It was scored moderate or low where “technical or
specialized information seemed somewhat easier to understand or where full
understanding seemed less crucial to correct decision making, because the evidence
was not so central, or because it was redundant with other easier to understand
evidence or because vaguer understanding would suffice.” Id.
121
Joseph Sanders, The Jury Deliberation in a Complex Case: Havner v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 45 (1993).
122
See Cecil et al., supra note 96, at 757-58 (1991). See, e.g., Thompson &
Schumann, supra note 98, at 167; Thompson, supra note 98, at 9.
123
See Paul Slovic et al., What Should We Know About Making Risk Comparisons?, 10
RISK ANALYSIS 389 (1990); see also Brandon B. Johnson, Stability and Inoculation of Risk
Comparisons’ Effects Under Conflict: Replicating and Extending the “Asbestos Jury” Study by
Slovic et al., 22 RISK ANALYSIS 777 (2002). A similar finding indicates the differences
in low probabilities has little impact on decisions. Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect:
Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 71-73 (2002); see also W. Kip Viscusi,
Jurors, Judges, and the Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (2001).
The ability to assess risk is further eroded in situations that are emotionally highly
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An examination of the cases Lempert scored as “high” on
difficulty reveals that when confronted with complex technical and
scientific evidence from competing experts, jurors have a difficult
124
time assessing the merits of the testimony.
Jurors are often
confronted with a “battle of the experts,” each of whom is chosen for
125
the ability to be convincing and appear credible. This point leads
to the second body of data that directly addresses how juries respond
to experts.
2. The Jury and Expert Witnesses
It is a common misperception that juries are overwhelmed by
126
experts simply because they are experts. The ABA study found, for
example, that the jurors in their four cases were not overly impressed
127
with the experts, and dismissed many of them as “hired guns.” In
fact, the Committee concluded that a witness who is perceived to be a
128
“hired gun” can do positive harm to a party’s case.

charged. See Reid Hastie, Emotions in Juror’s Decisions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 991 (2001)
(summarizing the relevant psychology literature).
124
The three were the ABA trade secrets case, the asbestos exposure case, and the
ground water contamination case. Pacelle, supra note 199, at 75-80; SELVIN & PINKUS,
supra note 119, at 4.
125
See Anthony Champagne et al., An Empirical Examination of the Use of Expert
Witnesses in American Courts, 4 JURIMETRICS J. 375 (1991); see also Samuel Gross, Expert
Evidence, 1991 WISC. L. REV. 1113 (1991).
126
One might be tempted to conclude, as apparently the Kuhn court did, that if a
jury is not overwhelmed by a piece of testimony there is no need for a reliability
filter. This does not logically follow. A hypothetical example may help to
demonstrate this point. Assume that the reliability of expert evidence could be
measured on a scale of one to ten, with the most reliable evidence scored ten. Also
assume the jury is presented with a piece of evidence with a score of one on our
reliability scale. If jurors are overwhelmed by all expert testimony, this would mean,
one presumes, that they would believe that this evidence is much more reliable, say
eight on our scale. Clearly, this would cause them to mis-estimate the evidentiary
value of the evidence. Moreover, if jurors were routinely overwhelmed by all expert
testimony, they could make no distinctions between any evidence. Evidence with a
score of four on our hypothetical reliability scale would be considered as good as
evidence actually scoring an eight and no better that the evidence with a score of
one. However, even if jurors are not overwhelmed, this does not mean they will
properly weigh the reliability of evidence. They might simply disregard all expert
evidence, effectively giving it a reliability score of one, or they could give all evidence
a five, and thus still fail to distinguish between evidence scoring eight, evidence
scoring four, and evidence scoring one.
127
SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 117, at 40. This finding agrees with other
research on the impact of experts. See studies summarized in Neil Vidmar, “Assessing
the Impact of Statistical Evidence, A Social Science Perspective,” in THE EVOLVING ROLE OF
STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS 279 (Stephen Fienberg ed.,
1989).
128
SPECIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 117, at 42; see also Scott Sundby, The Jury as
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Daniel Shuman and his colleagues conducted a group of studies
and concluded that jurors do not mechanically defer to experts
because of their expertise. Rather, they are far more skeptical in
129
their assessments.
Molly Selvin and Larry Pinkus report a general skepticism, if not
a negative disposition, by jurors toward the experts in the asbestos
130
case.
Apparently, a frequent jury response to difficult scientific
issues is to downplay the importance of the experts and their
testimony. For example, Shari Diamond and Jonathan Casper,
reporting on a laboratory study of jury decision-making in a complex
antitrust case, noted that “lack of clarity, that is, perceived complexity
and difficulty, discourages the jurors from accepting an expert’s
131
position, rather than inducing them to accept it.” Mitchell Pacelle’s
report of the ground water contamination case suggests that jurors
answered some questions with little reference to the science
132
introduced to address the issue. Perhaps the clearest statement of
this view is to be found in the following comment made by a juror in
an asbestos case studied by Goodman, Green, and Loftus: “[t]he
expert testimony was not a real factor in our decision, except in the
133
very backhanded sense that it lent medical credence to any result.”
The evidence that jurors do not overrate experts does not mean
that jurors always understand experts. In the face of difficult,
conflicting expert testimony, jurors have three options. First, as the
quote above suggests, is simply to disregard the testimony and decide
the case on other grounds. Second, is to slog through the testimony
and assess the testimony on the merits. Third, is to rely on other
indicia of whom to believe. Determining when individuals will
choose between the second and third alternatives is the subject of a

Critic: An Eempirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony. 83 VA.
L. REV. 1109 (1997) (providing a concurring opinion).
129
Daniel Shuman & Anthony Champagne, Removing the People from the Legal
Process: The Rhetoric and Research on Judicial Selection and Juries, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
LAW 242, 258 (1997).
In a valuable article published too late for me to include, Ivkovic and Hans
discuss juror evaluations of experts in seven cases. Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic & Valerie P.
Hans, Jurors’ Evaluations of Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 441 (2003).
130
SELVIN & PINKUS, supra note 119, at 77.
131
Shari Diamond & Jonathan Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences:
Damages, Experts and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC’Y. REV. 513, 543 (1992).
132
Mitchell Pacelle, Contaminated Verdict, AM. LAW. 75, 80 (Dec. 1986).
133
Jane Goodman et al., What Confuses Jurors in Complex Cases, TRIAL 65, 68 (Nov.
1985); see also Sanja Ivkovich & Valerie Hans, Jurors and Experts, 16 ADVOCATE: THE
MAGAZINE FOR DELAWARE TRIAL LAWYERS 17 (1994).
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body of research on decision making in settings that involve
persuasion attempts. This research indicates that people employ two
basic cognitive processes to assist them in decision making: central
134
processing and peripheral processing.
In central or systematic processing, people examine the content
of a communication to assess its validity. Persuasion is primarily a
135
function of the quality of the arguments presented. In peripheral
or heuristic processing, people do not attend to the quality and
validity of arguments. Rather, they adopt shortcuts to determine the
value of a message. People rely on factors such as the number of
arguments (rather than their quality), the attractiveness of the
communicator, and the communicator’s credentials.
Joel Cooper, Elizabeth Bennett, and Holly Sukel conducted a
laboratory experiment on the effects of trial complexity on juror
136
assessment of expert testimony in a laboratory setting. The subjects
viewed a one-hour videotape of a civil case involving a person who
claimed that exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) caused
his cancer. In the video, the defendant conceded that the plaintiff
had been exposed, thus the only factual issue was whether the
137
exposure caused the illness.
The evidence on this question was
presented by two expert witnesses, one for each side.
The
experiment manipulated the linguistic complexity of the testimony of
138
one of the experts. The experiment also manipulated the expert’s

134

See Alice Eagly & Shelly Chaiken, Attitude Structure and Function, in 1 HANDBOOK
PSYCHOL. 269 (Daniel Gilbert et al. eds., 1998); see also Richard Petty & Duane
Wegener, Attitude Change: Multiple Roles for Persuasion Variables, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
SOC. PSYCHOL. 323 (Daniel Gilbert et al. eds., 1998); RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T.
CACIOPO, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO
ATTITUDE CHANGE (1986); Shelly Chaiken, Heuristic Versus Systematic Information
Processing and the Use of Source Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. PERS. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 752 (1980).
135
Joel Cooper et al., Complex Scientific Testimony: How Do Jurors Make Decisions?, 20
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 379, 381 (1996).
136
Id.
137
Id. at 384.
138
For example, in the low complexity condition the expert made statements such
as this: “In the rats and mice, PCBs caused not only liver disease but also cancer of
the liver. In additional [sic] to the liver damages, [the study] found diseases of the
immune system as well.” Id. at 385. In the high complexity condition, the expert
made statements such as this: “[The study] reported tumor induction in rats and
mice. [The study] also reported that not only rats and mice, but in monkeys as well,
there was hepatomegaly, hepatomegalocytosis and lymphoid atrophy in both spleen
and thymus.” Id. The testimony of the other expert was “complex” in all conditions.
Id. The manipulation of linguistic complexity rather than actual scientific or
technical complexity is a shortcoming of this study. In actual trials, experts are
coached to reduce their arguments to simple terms that can be understood by lay
OF SOC.
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139

credentials.
In the high complexity condition, ninety-one percent
of the jurors voted for the plaintiff when the case was presented by an
expert with high credentials, but only sixty-four percent of the jurors
voted for the plaintiff when the case was presented by an expert with
140
low credentials. This difference is statistically significant.
In the
low-complexity condition, the effect of expert credentials was not
significant. However, jurors were more likely to vote for the plaintiff
when the testimony was presented by the expert with low credentials,
and there was a significant interaction between the level of
141
complexity and the strength of credentials.
This interaction was
also significant when the jurors were asked to estimate the probability
142
that PCBs were the cause of the plaintiff’s illness.
In the highcomplexity case, jurors who heard the highly-credentialed expert
concluded, on average, that there was a ninety-six percent probability
that the PCBs caused the cancer. On the other hand, jurors who
heard the low credentialed expert concluded, on average, that it was
143
only forty-nine percent probable that this was the case.
In a second article, Joel Cooper and Isaak Neuhaus reported
three experiments that assessed the effect of high pay and frequent
144
testifying on jury judgments of experts at trial.
In the first
experiment, a highly credentialed expert who was paid $4,800 a day
had less influence on jurors than either an expert who was paid less,
an expert with lesser credentials, or both. A second experiment

people. Thus, the circumstances of this manipulation are unlikely to occur in actual
trials. The study is also limited by the fact that the “jurors” did not deliberate.
139
In the “high” condition, the expert had advanced degrees from highly
prestigious universities, was currently teaching and conducting research at a similar
institution, and had published many articles on cancer in peer-reviewed journals. In
the “low” condition, the expert received a degree from a relatively obscure
institution, taught at a large state university, and had published far fewer articles.
Subjects perceived the individual with high credentials to have more expertise.
Cooper et al., supra note 135, at 386.
140
Id. at 387.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 388.
143
Id. Vidmar and Diamond challenge Cooper’s interpretation of this result.
Neil Vidmar & Shari S. Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121,
1154-55 (2001). They note that the Cooper study tested juror comprehension of the
testimony and jurors in all four experimental conditions indicated good
comprehension. They argue that the strong and consistent performance on
comprehension is important because it suggests that jurors centrally processed the
testimony and did not rely simply on the more impressive educational and
professional background of the highly credentialed expert.
144
Joel Cooper & Isaak M. Neuhaus, The “Hired Gun” Effect: Assessing the Effect of
Pay, Frequency of Testifying, and Credentials on the Perception of Expert Testimony, 24 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 149 (2000).
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manipulated the rate of pay and expert witness testifying experience
independently. The highly paid expert was found to be less
persuasive when he also had a substantial history of testifying. In a
third experiment, Cooper and Neuhaus manipulated expert pay and
the complexity of the expert’s language. All the experts used in this
study were experienced and highly credentialed. Again, there was an
interaction effect. The expert using highly complex language and
paid the top rate was less persuasive than the experts in the other
conditions (less complex testimony and/or paid less). The jury also
saw this expert as the least honest. Cooper and Neuhaus concluded
that experts who are highly paid and who testify frequently are
145
perceived as hired guns who are neither liked nor believed. As in
their earlier study, Cooper and Neuhaus interpret these results as
supporting the shift to peripheral processing when faced with
complex, cognitively challenging testimony.
As they did with respect to Cooper’s earlier study, Vidmar and
Diamond question whether these results are best explained as an
146
example of peripheral processing.
They argue that a competing
explanation is that the jurors centrally processed the testimony, but
rejected it when the expert’s motives were suspect. Vidmar and
Diamond’s disagreement with the Cooper and Neuhaus
interpretation does highlight two facts. First, central processing and
peripheral processing are not mutually exclusive methods of
thinking. Juries, like other decision makers, may engage in a
combination of central and peripheral strategies when making up
147
their mind. Indeed, the competing explanation offered by Vidmar
and Diamond suggest just such a process. Jurors may have attempted
to centrally process the expert testimony, but discounted the
testimony of some experts based on the peripheral information that
they were highly paid and, therefore, their motive was suspect.
Second, peripheral processing can be a better or worse decision
making strategy depending on the peripheral cues used to come to a
decision because some cues are better indicia of reliability than
others. For example, the first Cooper and Neuhaus study argued that
an expert’s credentials counted as a positive factor in assessing the
145

Id.
Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 143, at 1156 (2001).
147
For example, Greenberg and Wursten found that simulated jurors were
influenced more by medical expert testimony than by psychological expert testimony
even when the testimony presented by the experts was identical in form and
complexity. J. Greenberg & A. Wursten, The Psychologist and the Psychiatrist as Expert
Witnesses: Perceived Credibility and Influence, 19 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 373
(1988).
146
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validity of their argument whereas in the second study, the
comparatively excessive compensation paid to the expert acted as a
negative factor. Most students of expert testimony would predict that
within a given case, differences in credentials and fees are a weak
predictor of validity. However, they may believe other cues are even
worse, e.g. the gender of the expert.
On the other hand, they might believe that other factors such as
the Daubert factors of general acceptance, and peer review and
publication are better because they are more probative as to the
reliability of expert testimony. In fact, as the following study indicates
there is some research indicating that jurors may use this type of
peripheral information as well.
In a laboratory experiment using undergraduate subjects to
examine “juror” reasoning skills about the scientific validity of expert
evidence in a gender discrimination case, Margaret Kovera and her
148
colleagues manipulated four variables.
The first manipulation
involved the publication status of the underlying research that
formed the basis of the expert’s testimony. Some jurors heard that
the research had been published in a peer-reviewed journal and had
been cited in major psychology texts while other jurors heard the
research had been submitted for publication, but not published or
cited.
In a second manipulation, “ecological validity” was
149
manipulated. Some jurors heard that the subjects in the underlying
study had been college students and others that they had been blue
collar employees in a company similar to the defendant company. A
third manipulation involved the “construct validity” of the underlying
150
study.
Some jurors heard that there was but a single measure of
sexual harassment while others heard that there were multiple
measures. A fourth manipulation varied the quality of the crossexamination. In the scientifically uninformed version, the cross was
restricted to general questions such as whether the expert was
qualified to make a legal determination regarding the occurrence of
sexual harassment. In the informed version, the cross drew attention

148

Margaret B. Kovera et al., Reasoning About Scientific Evidence: Effects of Juror
Gender and Evidence Quality on Juror Decisions in a Hostile Work Environment Case, 84 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 362 (1999).
149
Ecological validity is a species of external validity. External validity involves the
ability to generalize conclusions to particular persons, settings, and times and to types
of persons, settings, and times. See THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASIEXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN AND ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD TESTING 71 (1979).
150
Construct validity problems may arise when one has a single operationalization
of a cause or an effect: a mono-operation bias. More reliable research includes
multiple operationalizations. COOK & CAMPBELL, supra note 149, at 67.
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to the issues of ecological and construct validity.
The subjects rated the expert evidence as more valid if it had
151
been published. None of the other manipulations affected validity
judgments, but the jurors did judge the expert as more credible if she
studied the responses of individuals who resembled the plaintiff’s
152
coworkers.
Jurors were not sensitive to variations in the construct
validity manipulation. This was the case whether or not the jurors
153
heard the scientifically sophisticated cross-examination.
In my judgment, the weight of the experimental research
suggests that jurors do engage in peripheral processing when
assessing expert testimony and that the peripheral cues take on
added significance as the scientific issues in the case become more
154
complex.
Trial lawyers tend to agree with at least the first part of this
conclusion. Sanders, Diamond, and Vidmar conducted two separate
focus groups with groups of Texas trial lawyers who concentrate on
155
products liability cases. One focus group was with plaintiff lawyers
and one with defense counsel. Defense lawyers expressed concerns
about the impact of many personal factors on the effectiveness of
expert testimony. These factors included, inexperience on the
156
157
158
159
stand, high fees, where the expert is from, presentation style,
160
and other personal factors. For example, one defense lawyer made
the following comment:
151

Kovera et al., supra note 148, at 370.
Id.
153
Id. at 372.
154
See also Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific
Expert Testimony on Juror Decision Making in Capital Sentencing, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 267 (2002).
155
Joseph Sanders et al., Trial Lawyer Perceptions of Expert Knowledgethe Law
and Society Association Meeting in Miami, Florida) (on file with author).
156
Transcript of Defense Lawyer Focus Group, at 43(March 1999) (on file with
author).
157
Id. at 14, 26.
158
Id. at 25.
159
Id. at 6.
160
Id. at 57. One lawyer commented on an expert who:
is such a good doctor, he is so analytical, he lays the case out, he goes
through the medical records with a fine tooth comb. He gives you
every variation, every theory, but the guy, I mean I hate to say it, he’s
the most unattractive person in the world. You just wouldn’t put him
in front of the jury. He’s got a bookish appearance and just an
unattractive way, he talks in a monotone and just for all of those
reasons, he as no appeal whatsoever as a jury expert but he’s probably
the best analytical expert.
Id. at 36.
152
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I tried a case in Sierra Blanca, which is down on the Rio Grande
River a little while back and you have to carefully pick your
witnesses down there so that the jury can identify with them and
get along with them and their manner of speech and their
161
manner of presentation.

These comments reflect the attorneys’ perceptions that jurors are
likely, perhaps more likely than a judge, to rely on peripheral rather
than central processing in assessing the testimony of an expert.
Some defense lawyers also expressed a concern that jurors may
not understand the content of expert testimony in complex cases.
One lawyer noted:
We all settle cases that we strongly believe in the defense of a case
from a technical standpoint because there is that lingering doubt
that even though you’re able to hopefully translate the technical
aspect, the medical aspect to the jury, there is still that lingering
doubt that the emotional aspects of the case is going to
overwhelm the jury’s ability to understand and process a complex
162
case.

Plaintiff lawyers also discussed both the ability of jurors to
properly discount extraneous factors and their ability to understand
expert testimony. They, too, were concerned about how an expert
will appear before the court. As one attorney noted, “there have
been cases where somebody, after I met them, I said ‘you know, they
are just not going to look too shiny and I need to go get a show dog
163
and do a handoff.’” Generally, the lawyers agreed that if one has a
bad witness, it is rarely worth the effort to send him to “charm
school.” One lawyer noted, however, that this is a more common
practice on the defense side. At an earlier point in his career, when
he represented large corporations, the lawyer noted:
it was not unusual at all to send an expert that’s being used
nationwide to witness school in California and they became very
polished. They learned that when you answer a question you look
at the jury when you answer it. And they learned how you can
occasionally slip something into your testimony and how to sound
164
sincere.
161

Transcript of Defense Lawyer Focus Group, at 6.
Id. at 73-74.
163
Transcript of Plaintiff Lawyer Focus Group, at 36.
164
Id. at 42. These comments suggest that lawyers are concerned that jurors
might be influenced by factors such as presentation style. But when asked directly
whether jurors can understand expert testimony, the plaintiff lawyers responded with
an adamant “yes.” A few comments provide a flavor of this fervor: “Around this table
everybody will give you the same answer. Yeah, we trust juries, we believe in juries
even when they pour us out.” Id. at 64. (“Pour us out” is a Texas lawyer expression
162
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There is one other body of research that addresses an issue
similar to, but not quite the same as peripheral processing. That is
the tendency of jurors (and potentially other fact finders), to trade
off the elements of a tort in arriving at a verdict. For example, the
jury may believe that the plaintiff’s causation argument is weak but
that the defendant’s behavior was particularly egregious. Considered
together, the breach of duty “makes up for” the weak causal
165
evidence.
The evidence that this occurs comes in the form of
experiments on bifurcation.
Zeisel and Callahan conducted a field experiment on the effects
of bifurcation of liability and damages in the Northern District of
Illinois in the early 1960s. They found that defendants prevailed in
fifty-six percent of bifurcated trials, but in only thirty-four percent of
166
unitary trials.
In a laboratory experiment, Horowitz and Bordens
found that juries hearing a unitary trial were significantly more likely
to find for the plaintiff (85%) than were juries that heard bifurcated
trials (68%). This tendency was strongest when the bifurcated trial
juries heard the general causation testimony first. If these juries did
find for the plaintiff, however, their compensatory damages awards
167
were significantly larger.
Horowitz and Bordens used tape transcripts of their juries’
deliberations to explain these results. Juries that heard bifurcated
trials independently decided each element of the cause of action. In

for a jury defense verdict.) “They have phenomenal ability to cut through the
bullshit.” Id. at 64.
As with the opinions of defense attorneys, it is not easy to completely reconcile
these statements about jury ability with a concern that the personal attributes of an
expert may cause the rejection of an otherwise sound analysis. Clearly, however, the
plaintiff attorneys we spoke with view the abilities of juries more favorably than
defense attorneys.
165
The tendency to make this tradeoff is partly the result of a heuristic of culpable
causation, i.e., the tendency to weigh the causal impute of a factor more heavily if the
factor is the result of moral blamewothiness. For example, in one study a person is
speeding home and collides with another car. The driver of the second car is
injured. Study participants were asked to assess the degree to which the speeder’s
driving causally contributed to the accident. In one condition of the experiment the
driver was speeding to hide an anniversary present before his spouse got home and
in a second condition he was speeding to hide drugs. Subjects assigned more
causation to the person in the latter condition than the former condition even
though the reason for speeding has no logical connection to the degree to which
speeding caused the accident. Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 368 (1992).
166
Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical
Analysis, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1612 (1963).
167
Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, An Experimental Investigation of
Procedural Issues in Complex Tort Trials, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269, 277-78 (1990).
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contrast, unitary juries failed to separate elements:
[E]vidence for matters not directly related to the issue under
consideration intruded on the decision-making process. For
example, when deciding general causation, unitary juries
appeared to use aspects of the damages evidence. At each
decision point, juries searched in other areas, especially evidence
concerning damages, to buttress their decisions. This was evident
when juries were faced with the most ambiguous trial issue,
general causation . . . . Separated trials are structured so that the
reinterpretation of the general causation evidence is less likely
because many of these juries do not hear damages evidence. . . .
In fact, only 25% of the juries in the separated condition hearing
only causation evidence . . . found for the plaintiffs, whereas
87.5% of the unitary trial juries, which only decided causation
168
(but heard all of the evidence), found for the plaintiffs.

Other jury experiments have generated similar results and
169
researchers offer a similar interpretation.
Diamond and Vidmar note that reasoning skills that might
170
improve jury performance can be taught.
It is not clear, however,
how jurors would be given these skills absent the use of a court
appointed master or court appointed expert.
Under normal
circumstances, jury errors are likely. The question remains, of
course, whether restrictive admissibility rules have any beneficial
affect on the error rate. The answer to that question turns in part on
the evidence concerning the characteristics of the speakers
(witnesses) and the characteristics of the controller (the judicial
gatekeeper).
B. The Characteristics of the Speakers
Juries do not hear cases in a vacuum. The evidence comes from
expert witnesses. Their characteristics interact with those of jurors in
affecting the likelihood that jurors will arrive at true verdicts. Just as
juror decision making is shaped by the rules of evidence and other
rules surrounding deliberation processes, expert testimony is shaped
by the way it is presented in American trials. In this Section, I review

168

Id. at 282.
Jonathan D. Casper et al., Juror Decision Making, Attitudes, and the Hindsight Bias,
13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291 (1989). Recent articles arguing for bifurcation as a way
to focus jury decision making include Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75
WASH. L. REV. 705 (2000), and Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV.
1601 (2001).
170
Diamond & Vidmar, Juries and Expert Evidence, supra note 143, at 1135 (2001);
see also Nisbett et al., supra note 108.
169
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empirical evidence on the effect of the expert’s role on expert
testimony and then turn to evidence concerning the effect of the
expert’s demeanor.
1. The Effect of the Expert’s Role on Expert Testimony
Any discussion of speaker characteristics must address the
adversarial status of experts in the American system. In inquisitorial
systems such as Belgium, France, Germany, and Japan, the judge
plays a large role in the production of evidence. Experts are almost
always court appointed and are asked to submit written reports.
Parties may be given the opportunity to object to a particular expert,
question the expert about the opinion rendered, or hire their own
expert to rebut the court-appointed expert, but the process is
171
relatively non-adversarial.
By way of contrast, our system is one in
which the parties generally select, prepare, and present experts.
Court appointed experts are rare. The vast majority of experts are
172
party witnesses.
A substantial body of psychological literature suggests that
adopting a role affects attention to details, memory retrieval, and
173
decision thresholds.
Some research on witnesses confirms this
effect. In one study, Shepard and Vidmar, conducted an experiment
where undergraduates viewed a slide show and heard an audio tape
depicting a fight. The “witnesses” then were interviewed by an
adversary or non-adversary lawyer and a week later testified about
what they saw. Witnesses interviewed by the adversary lawyer biased
their testimony in favor of the lawyer’s client and this affected the
impressions of the factual evidence and the responsibility judgments
of “naive” adjudicators who did not know who had interviewed the
174
witness.
171

CAROL A.G. JONES, EXPERT WITNESSES: SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND THE PRACTICE OF
LAW (1994); see also John Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985); Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial
Justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983 (1999).
172
See Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a
Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995 (1994);
see also Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, The Use of Court-Appointed Experts in Federal
Courts, 78 JUDICATURE J. 41 (July-Aug. 1994); Carol Krafka et al., Judge and Attorney
Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal Civil Trials, 8
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 309 (2002).
173
See D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects
in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 18-19
(2002).
174
Blair H. Sheppard & Neil Vidmar, Adversary Pretrial Procedures and Testimonial
Evidence: Effects of Lawyer’s Role and Machiavellianism, 39 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 320
(1980).
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In a follow-up study, Vidmar and Laird had students witness the
175
same fight stimulus. This time the experimenters manipulated the
students’ role simply by telling the students they would appear either
as a witness of the court or as a witness for either the plaintiff or the
defendant. Student “judges” who were blind to this manipulation
were asked to rate whether the evidence provided by the witness
favored the plaintiff or the defendant. Separately, a set of raters
heard the testimony of the witnesses and rated it as more or less proplaintiff. For both “judges” and raters, when compared to witnesses
who testified from a neutral role, witnesses who testified for an
176
adversary party produced testimony favorable to that party.
Interestingly, when the witnesses themselves were asked to rate the
evidence as pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant, their assigned role did not
influence their judgment, i.e. the ratings of “plaintiff,” “defendant,”
and neutral witnesses did not significantly differ from one another.
One must be careful in drawing conclusions from a study that is
so weak on ecological validity. However, the results do suggest that
very weak “role” manipulations can produce biasing effects even
among “witnesses” who themselves have no psychological or
economic interest in a given outcome. In general, experts are more
177
likely to come to the stand with “hot biases.”
Such biases are not
necessarily intentional but they are directionally motivated. The
178
experts are more likely to want a certain outcome to prevail. Justice
Breyer expressed this concern with respect to the plaintiff’s expert’s
179
testimony in Kumho.
175

Neil Vidmar & Nancy MacDonald Laird, Adversary Social Roles: Their Effects on
Witnesses’ Communications of Evidence and the Assessments of Adjudicators, 44 J. PERS. &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 888 (1983).
176
Id. at 893.
177
Some biases are intentional, e.g. those that are the result of fraud or advocacy.
Other biases may be thought of as “hot.” They are often unintentional and even
unconscious but they are directionally motivated because the individual expects or
wants an outcome to prevail. Still other biases are “cold.” They occur even in the
absence of a desire for a certain outcome and in spite of a desire to achieve accuracy.
Robert J. MacCoun, Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research Results, in ANN. REV.
OF PSYCHOL. 259, 268 (Janet T. Spence et al. eds., 1998).
178
Id. at 268.
179
Indeed, no one has argued that Carlson himself, were he still working for
Michelin,
would have concluded in a report to his employer that a similar tire was
similarly defective on grounds identical to those upon which he rested
his conclusion here. Of course, Carlson himself claimed that his
method was accurate, but, as we pointed out in Joiner, “nothing in
either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court
to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by
the ipse dixit of the expert.” 522 U.S. at 146.
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These hot biases may in turn increase the likelihood of cold
180
biases. Indeed, the two may merge together to form what MacCoun
describes as “warm” biases, influenced both by motivation and
181
cognition.
When federal judges are asked about problems they
encounter with expert testimony, the most frequently mentioned
problem is that experts abandon objectivity and become advocates
182
for the side that hired them.

Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 157.
180
Meadow and Sunstein provide a useful example of cold biases in the context of
medical doctor judgements concerning bacterial meningitis in children. They note
that the disease is an infection of the brain that can usually be treated with antibiotics
and, in general, the sooner the antibiotics are begun the better the outcome. In a
malpractice case, therefore, an important question is whether the treatment was
unreasonably delayed.
The authors interviewed doctors with relevant specialties to determine how long,
in their opinion, it would take to administer antibiotics to a child brought to the
emergency room with relevant symptoms, and compared their response with the
actual time it took to administer antibiotics to ninety-three children treated at two
large university-associated pediatric centers in Chicago. The doctors, like most
individuals, exhibited an optimism bias. The median estimate of fifty-four pediatric
emergency room specialists was forty-six minutes and that of twenty-three pediatric
infectious disease specialists was eighty minutes. But the actual median time to
treatment in the two hospitals was 120 minutes, a time nearly identical to times
reported in hospitals in South Carolina and California. The authors note that this
bias operates independently of the pressures imposed by the adversary system.
William Meadow & Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51 DUKE L.J. 629, 636-39
(2001).
Anchoring effects are another example of a cold bias. Anchoring effects occur
when estimates people make are influenced by arbitrary starting positions. For
example, estimates of the length of the Mississippi River, the number of countries in
the U.N., and the annual meat consumption of the average American, all are
affected by asking people whether the number is above or below some arbitrary
starting point. Michael Risinger et al., supra note 173, at 17.
181
MacCoun, supra note 177, at 268.
182
Carol Krafka et al., supra note 172, at 328.
One solution to this latter difficulty would be the greater use of court appointed
experts. Some are concerned, however, that such testimony would overwhelm and
unduly influence the jury. There is a certain irony in the fact that this objection is
itself a paternalistic argument. It argues that juries will engage in peripheral
processing by focusing on the neutral status of the expert rather than centrally
processing the merits of the expert’s argument. Brekke et al., conducted a
laboratory experiment designed to assess this potential. Registered voters who
volunteered to participate were shown a videotape re-enactment of a sexual assault
trial. Nancy J. Brekke et al., Of Juries and Court - Appointed Experts: The Impact of
Nonadversarial versus Adversarial Expert Testimony, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 451 (1991).
In adversarial versions of the trial the testimony was presented by an expert
introduced as a prosecution witness and examined by attorneys, while in nonadversarial versions the expert was introduced as a court-appointed expert and
questioned only by the judge. In a fully crossed design, the content of the expert’s
testimony was also manipulated. Half the jurors heard one-sided testimony (favoring
the prosecution) while others heard balanced testimony. Some subjects deliberated
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Jurors are not stupid, however. They know that the experts are
testifying for a party. There is some evidence that jurors give greater
183
scrutiny to adversarial testimony than non-adversarial testimony.
However, witness biases are often difficult to detect. This is especially
so when the expert offers only a holistic, summary judgment without
a detailed discussion of the factors that produce the judgment. The
use of objective, rational admissibility criteria increases the likelihood
184
that unreliable opinions will be excluded.

in groups of six, while others did not deliberate. All subjects were asked to assess the
expert’s credibility and to rate the expert’s testimony. The results provide mixed
support to those who are concerned about the effects of court appointed experts.
On the one hand, fears that a court-appointed expert would simply overwhelm jurors
were not supported. Court-appointed status did not boost the expert’s credibility.
Id. at 468. On the other hand, deliberating jurors were less responsive to the content
of the non-adversarial experts. For example, conviction rates varied with the content
of the expert testimony in the adversarial condition, but not in the non-adversarial
condition. Id. at 470. One explanation for this result is that non-adversarial expert
testimony is subjected to less central processing, but the authors note that their study
is not well-designed to test this explanation.
Note that in the above study, the subjects heard either a court-appointed expert
or a party expert, but the experts were not pitted against each other. In actual trials,
it would be more likely that jurors would hear both types of experts. Cooper and
Hall conducted a study that did exactly this. Joel Cooper & Joan Hall, Reactions of
Mock Jurors to Testimony of a Court Appointed Expert, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 719 (2000).
Undergraduates, playing the role of jurors heard testimony about a plaintiff’s injury
in an automobile accident. In some conditions, medical testimony was presented by
party experts for each side and in other conditions an additional, court-appointed
expert testified. In the cells with a court-appointed expert, half the time the expert
sided with the plaintiff and half the time the expert sided with the defendant.
Sometimes, the defendant was an individual, and sometimes a corporation. There
was no deliberation. The jurors sided with the court-appointed expert in every
condition except when the expert favored a corporate defendant.
183
Brekke et al., supra note 182, at 457-58.
184
See Joseph Sanders, Kumho and How We Know, 64(2 & 3) LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 373 (2001). For example, in Hall v. Baxter Healthcare, 947 F. Supp.1387, 140405 (D. Or. 1996), the district court ultimately excluded the testimony of an
epidemiological expert who, at an initial admissibility hearing, stated that he was not
willing to testify, based on the then existing sixteen epidemiological studies, that
silicone implants more likely than not could cause systemic autoimmune disease in
women. However, later, with the release of one additional abstract of an
unpublished epidemiological study, the expert reported that he was prepared to
change his testimony and say that it is more likely than not that implants cause
systemic autoimmune disease. The abstract itself reports that it included only three
women with implants and the authors of the abstract reached a different conclusion
than the expert. The Judge’s response to this change of position was perhaps
predictable. He said in a footnote, “I find this change in so-called ‘scientific opinion’
not only suspect but shocking, with no scientific basis to support it. This is exactly
the type of ‘junk science’ that the Supreme Court in Daubert I commanded courts to
exclude.” Id. It is not my point to argue whether this expert’s testimony should be
admitted, but only to note that, had the expert been asked simply to present a
summary opinion about the relationship of silicone implants and autoimmune
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Role effects have the potential to affect not only the testimony of
the individual expert but the total body of testimony presented to the
jury. A number of commentators have observed that because the
experts are chosen by the parties, the system favors the selection of
experts with extreme views, rather than views that are representative
185
of the scientific community.
This may give the jurors the
186
impression that there is less consensus in a field than actually exists.
For example, I interviewed jurors in one of the Bendectin cases.
Most would agree that the research on the question of whether the
drug caused birth defects in the offspring of the mothers who took it
to control morning sickness clearly points in the direction of no
causal relationship, and this is the position of the great majority of
knowledgeable scientists.
Nevertheless, the jurors generally
concluded that scientists were divided equally on the issue, or that
187
most scientists thought Bendectin was a teratogen. Moreover, they
tended to discount the epidemiological evidence and rate
epidemiology in general as less probative than animal studies, and in
188
vitro research.
This result is not surprising within the context of
the trial. The jurors heard approximately an equal number of
experts on each side of the issue, lending an impression that the
189
scientific community was closely divided on the causal question.
Moreover, plaintiff’s experts stressed the importance of other types of

disease, it would have been much more difficult to assess his potential bias.
185
MICHAEL J. SAKS & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN
LITIGATION (1983).
186
SANDERS, supra note 96, at 130.
187
Id. at 126. This may be an example of an anchoring effect. When asked to
make numerical estimates, people are strongly influenced by the initial value
presented to them. Insofar as the jurors were “presented” with a similar number of
plaintiff and defense experts, this anchor may have influenced their final estimate of
the distribution of opinion on the causal question.
188
Id. at 129.
189
As Saks and Wissler note,
In civil litigation . . . all manner of experts are found to testify opposite
their colleagues.
Whether such “balancing” of expert witnesses helps the fact-finder
evaluate their testimony is another matter. The search for witnesses
that is driven by the adversary process may result in a distortion of
knowledge when applied to expert witnesses. For example, if 999 of
every 1000 experts in a given field hold one view of a question and one
holds an alternate view, the two experts who appear in court will have
been detached from the extremely skewed distribution of opinion from
which they were drawn. The fact finder has no way of knowing this.
Michael J. Saks & Roselle L. Wissler, Legal and Psychological Bases of Expert Testimony:
Surveys of the Law and of Jurors, 2 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 435, 439-40 (1984).
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evidence and frequently denigrated epidemiology. Consider the
following exchange between the plaintiff’s lawyer and a plaintiff
expert testifying, on the basis of in vitro studies, that is a teratogen in
humans.
Q: Well, Doctor, the kind of work that we’ve been talking about,
is that what’s known as hard science?
A: Yes.
Q: As opposed to soft science?
A: Yes.
Q: What is hard science?
A: Hard science is science that’s experimentally based, where the
data that’s collected is based on procedures, protocols that have
been designed to have groups that are treated with something,
groups that act as controls, all of the variables are under control
by the experimenter so that you administer the drugs at the same
time, you administer them to animals of a given age, the timing
and the environment of the experiment is under control, and,
therefore, you can rely on the data that comes out of a set of
experiments like this.
The experiments can be done by
somebody else in another laboratory and they can be confirmed if
they were correct in the first place and so on . . . .
Q: What would, for example, soft science be?
A: A soft science would be thing like taking polls of people
depending on their memory of circumstances.
Q: What about epidemiology; is that a soft science?
A: That’s a soft science, yes.

190

In the face of such testimony, it is not surprising that some jurors
may have a hard time coming to an appreciation about the balance of
scientific opinion on an issue. I described these jurors as one-eyed
fact-finders. “Far from being blind, they can see everything around
them. What they lack is depth perception. All experts appear
191
similarly qualified, all evidence of similar value and relevance.”
2. The Witness’s Demeanor
Because the truth of a witness’s statements is sometimes
impossible to verify, the law has long encouraged jurors to use the
witness’s demeanor as a clue to veracity. This is, of course, a type of
190

Testimony of Dr. Stuart Newman, at 12, Havner v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 88-3915-F. 214th Judicial District, Nueces County, Texas
(Sept. 6, 1991) ( on file with author).
191
Id. at 130.
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peripheral processing. Nevertheless, in the absence of any alternative
way to assess veracity, the law is simply bowing to the inevitable in
approving the use of demeanor evidence as an aid to decision
making. In fact, what evidence we have suggests that demeanor cues
192
often reduce accuracy in detecting witness deception.
Even when
deception is not an issue, aspects of a witness’s demeanor may
mislead the jury. For example, it is well documented that jurors tend
to believe that eyewitness accuracy is strongly correlated with
eyewitness certainty, even though the actual correlation is quite
193
weak.
In the domain of expert witness testimony, the problem is
exacerbated by selection effects. Sam Gross makes this point in the
following passage:
expert witnesses can become expert courtroom performers; they
can learn by repeated practice to present their testimony to
achieve maximum effect. Attorneys, for their part, can select
expert witnesses by the same criteria—they can (and do) shop
around for those experts with the best testimonial manner and
the most appealing credentials, and they avoid those experts
(however knowledgeable) who look bad, speak poorly, or have
194
insufficiently impressive diplomas.

The lawyers in the focus groups discussed above report choosing
experts in part because of their demeanor. All in all, as Brewer notes,
[d]emeanor is an especially untrustworthy guide where there is
what we might call a lucrative “market” for demeanor itself. . . .
Judges, lawyers, and commentators are thoroughly aware that
lawyers choose expert witnesses at least as much because they will
appear to a jury to be competent as because (in the lawyer’s
195
judgment) the experts actually are competent.

Similarly, in most cases involving complex scientific and technical
192

See Saks, supra note 93, at 21; see also Gerald R. Miller & Judee K. Burgoon,
Factors Affecting Assessments of Witness Credibility, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE
COURTROOM 169, 182-90 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982); Joseph W.
Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1, 7-16
(2000) (discussing the psychological literature on the ability to detect lying by the
use of demeanor cues).
193
See DAVID FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 20, ch. 15.
194
Gross, supra note 125, at 1133. Gross cites a number of “how to” books
recommending the selection of witness based in part on their demeanor. He cites a
1967 survey of judges, lawyers and doctors in the Los Angeles area that found that
“[o]ver three-quarters of the attorneys responding . . . indicated that some factor
other than medical expertise—usually an impressive ‘courtroom manner’—often
determines the choice of an expert witness.”
195
Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE L.J.
1535, 1622-23 (1998).
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evidence, the academic and professional credentials of the various
experts are sufficiently impressive and sufficiently similar that they
offer little useful information to a juror who might wish to assess the
196
merits of an argument based on the qualifications of its proponent.
In sum, the credentials and demeanor of an expert witness are
unlikely to be of much probative value to jurors in cases involving
complex issues.
C. The Characteristics of the Controller (Gatekeeper)
Articles about jury competence often note that it would be
wrong to assume that judges, acting as triers of fact, would do much
better. Anecdotal evidence is sometimes to the contrary. For
197
example, Gross cites Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.
By
agreement of the parties, the case was tried by the judge rather than a
jury, who found for the plaintiff in her claim that her mother’s use of
a contraceptive spermicide caused her birth defects. In his opinion,
Judge Shoob explained his verdict as follows:
The Court’s decision, therefore, turned on the oral testimony of a
variety of expert witnesses whose opinions often were
diametrically opposed on the major issues presented in the case.
In assessing the credibility of these witnesses, the Court
considered each expert’s background, training, experience, and
familiarity with the circumstances of this particular case; and the
Court evaluated the rationality and internal consistency of each
expert’s testimony in light of all the evidence presented. The
Court paid close attention to each expert’s demeanor and tone.
Perhaps most important, the Court did its best to ascertain the
motives, biases, and interests that might have influenced each
expert’s opinion.
With few exceptions, the Court found the testimony of plaintiffs’
experts generally to be competent, credible, and directed to the
specific circumstances of this case. The testimony of defendant’s
198
experts, in contrast, often indicated bias or inconsistency.

The judge then proceeded to provide a bill of particulars concerning
his judgment about individual plaintiff and defense experts.
Unfortunately, the judge was wrong.
Relying on the same
considerations that may send a jury astray, demeanor and prejudice,
the judge ruled for the plaintiff even in the face of an FDA report

196

See SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL, supra note 96, at 120-22.
615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff’d and modified in part, 788 F.2d 741 (11th
Cir. 1986).
198
Id. at 266-67.
197

2003

THE MERITS OF PATERNALISTIC JUSTIFICATION

925

concluding that the spermicide did not cause birth defects. The
judge discounted the FDA report because one of the defense experts
had served as a consultant to the FDA panel of scientists who
199
conducted the investigation.
A single case does not resolve the
issue of judicial competence, of course, but it is far from the only
evidence that judges, too, may have trouble assessing complex expert
200
testimony, especially testimony involving statistical evidence.
Judges are also susceptible to the usual cognitive biases that
afflict most people. Guthrie, et al., asked 167 United States magistrate
judges to respond to a five page questionnaire that presented them
with five items designed to assess the influence of five common
cognitive biases: (1) anchoring (the misuse of an artificial initial value
on a numerical estimate); (2) framing (the effect of framing a
decision in terms of “gains” or “losses” on risky decisions); (3)
hindsight bias (overestimating the probability of a known past
incident); (4) the representative heuristic (underutilization of base
rate information); and (5) egocentric biases (believing onself to be
201
above average on various dimensions).
To a greater or lesser
extent, the magistrates fell prey to each of the biases. However, the
authors concluded that judges did better than other groups with
202
respect to the framing and the representativeness heuristic biases.
They concluded that judges are likely to be better decision-makers in
circumstances where decision-making experience blunts the effects of
illusions. For example, even though both judges and jurors are
prone to anchoring effects, the deleterious effects of this problem is a
product of the reasonableness of the initial value. Insofar as judges
have better starting values, the adverse effects of anchoring will be
minimized. This might occur, for example, were the judge to assess
damages based on prior damage awards in similar cases rather than
on some value suggested by one of the litigants to the present
203
lawsuit. Similarly, if judges are better than juries with respect to the
representativeness heuristic, they may be in a better position to assess
the relevance of a piece of evidence. On the other hand, jurors
might be better in minimizing the effects of hindsight bias.
All of this data is quite instructive, but it is not entirely relevant
199

Gross, supra note 125, at 1123.
See Gary Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability
Enough?, 62 J. PERSON. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739 (1992); see also THE EVOLVING ROLE OF
STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989).
201
Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 817
(2001).
202
Id. at 817.
203
Id. at 826.
200
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to the admissibility question per se. The question is not whether we
should substitute fact finders. Rather, it is whether judges can
perform a gatekeeping role with sufficient skill that on balance they
improve the probability of a correct outcome at the end of the case.
This question leads us to the fourth variable, the controller’s
criterion of selection among speakers or messages.

D. The Controller’s Criterion of Selection Among Speakers or Messages
Data on how judges actually decide admissibility decisions is
quite limited. Sophia Gatowski and her colleagues conducted
telephone interviews with a sample of 400 state court trial judges
from all fifty states that was designed to assess their understanding of
204
the Daubert admissibility criteria.
Most of the judges reported
having some CLE training about scientific evidence, but ninety-six
percent reported no training about scientific methods and principles.
Therefore, it is unsurprising that the judges had difficulty explaining
the Daubert falsifiability and error rate criteria.
The authors
concluded that only four percent of the judges offered an
explanation that involved a clear understanding of falsifiability and
thirty-five percent gave answers that were clearly wrong. The results
were similar with respect to error rate. The judges did much better
when asked to explain peer review and general acceptance. Seventyone percent clearly understood the former and eighty-two percent
clearly understood the latter. Based on this study, one would
conclude that judges would do better by peripherally processing the
adequacy of expert testimony than by attempting to centrally process
the evidence with the first two Daubert criteria as a guide.
Unfortunately, it is unclear from this study whether the
problems judges had as a group in providing definitions translates
into poor admissibility decisions. Another study by Margaret Kovera
205
and Bradley McAuliff suggests that it may.
They surveyed circuit
court judges in Florida to examine whether they were able to identify
research flaws in proposed expert testimony in a hostile work
environment sexual harassment case. The expert proposed to testify
concerning a study the expert had conducted on whether exposure
to sexually suggestive materials influenced participants’ subsequent
204

Sophia Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on
Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433 (2001).
205
Margaret Kovera & Bradley McAuliff, The Effects of Peer Review and Evidence
Quality on Judge Evaluations of Psychological Science: Are Judges Effective Gatekeepers?, 85 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 574 (2000).
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interactions with a female confederate. Some judges heard a version
without methodological flaws. Others heard versions that were
206
altered to include one of three flaws: a missing control group, a
207
confound, or potential experimenter bias due to a non-blind
206

In the correctly done study, men exposed to sexually explicit materials were
compared with men who were not. In the first flawed study, the second group was
absent. Without a control group it is usually difficult to know what to make of any
results. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 20, § 4-4.1.2, offers
the following example:
[O]ccasionally people have suggested that marijuana, even if not
harmful in itself, is dangerous because it leads (by some
pharmacological or psychological or sociological route) to the use of
harder drugs. They have offered the suggestion that if a substantial
number of heroin addicts were found to have used marijuana when
they were younger, that would confirm the hypothesis. Figure 3 depicts
the pattern of data such commentators have in mind.
The
hypothetical data in the figure show sixty percent of a sample of 500
heroin addicts to have used marijuana at an earlier time.
Figure 3
Single row (or column) missing data pattern
Heroin
Addict

Smoke Marijuana at Time-1
Yes
No

at Time-2
Yes

300

200

No

—

—

Because these data [do not have a control group], they cannot reveal
whether or not a relationship exists. More specifically, without
comparison data we cannot know whether fewer than sixty percent,
about the same sixty percent, or more than sixty percent of people who
are not heroin addicts earlier smoked marijuana. And it is on that
comparison that the existence or non-existence of a relationship
depends.
Suppose, for example, that someone had proposed that drinking milk
as a child led to heroin addiction as an adult. The same table with
marijuana replaced by milk would reveal that more than ninety-nine
percent of heroin addicts drank milk as children. Would that reveal
that milk was to blame? Filling in the data for the rest of the table
would make clear that ninety-nine percent of non-heroin addicts drank
milk as children, and therefore no relationship between milk drinking
and heroin addiction existed. Until the rest of the data were supplied
for Figure 3, one could not tell whether a relationship existed between
marijuana smoking and heroin addiction, other than by speculating on
what the missing cells contained.
207
In a confounding situation, some other variable, often introduced as part of
the methodology of the study, may be what explains one’s result. Because of the
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208

confederate.
Judges’ ratings of the quality of the study did not differ based on
these manipulations. Judges were also asked to make an admissibility
decision concerning this expert. Again, the quality of the study did
not affect this decision. Judge rating of the reliability of the evidence
revealed some effect. Judges who had received training in scientific
methods rated the valid study significantly more positively than other
209
judges who had not undergone training. However, training seems
not to have sensitized judges to the specific methodological problems
associated with missing control groups or the lack of a blind
condition.
It is unfortunate that these studies did not include a sample of
federal judges. State court trial judges rarely write opinions and,
therefore, there is no opportunity to examine whether their inability
to provide a definition translates into poor judgments or, on the
other hand, whether when forced to rule on admissibility in a case
involving complex scientific data, judges are able to provide a clear
written explanation for their opinion.
Because federal judges do often write opinions, especially when
their admissibility decision has the effect of non-suiting one of the
parties, it is theoretically possible to assess judicial understanding by
looking at the opinions themselves. I am not aware of any systematic
effort to do this. My own reading of the vast majority of Daubert
opinions in toxic tort cases, leads me to believe that the opinions
210
themselves display a range of comprehension. Judging by opinions,
far more than four percent of the cases exhibit a clear understanding

study design, there is no way to separate out the independent effects of the variable
of interest and the confounder. In this study the confound was introduced by using
two research assistants. One of the assistants only interacted with men exposed to
sexual material and the other research assistant only interacted with men who were
not exposed. The problem is that we cannot now ascertain whether the effects we
observe are due to the presence or absence of sexually explicit materials or, on the
other hand, are due to differences in the attributes of the two research assistants. Of
course, the more similar the assistants are to each other, the less we may be
concerned by this threat to internal validity.
208
Best experimental practice “blinds” researchers (and often subjects as well) to
the treatment. Here, a confederate who observed participant interactions with
women employees knew whether the participants had or had not been in the
experimental condition. The danger is that this knowledge may skew the
confederate’s observation in favor of the underlying hypothesis (i.e. that exposure
alters behavior).
209
Margaret Kovera et al., Assessment of the Commonsense Psychology Underlying
Daubert, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 180, 186 (2002).
210
This nearly masochistic act is the result of required annual updates to a
treatise.
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of falsifiability and nowhere near thirty-five percent are clearly wrong.
The same might be said of the error rate. Moreover, many opinions
do not turn on either of these criteria, but rather on an analysis of
internal and external validity threats to the research underlying an
expert’s testimony and the fit between the findings in this research
211
and the conclusions drawn by the expert.
The fact that the federal district court opinions paint a more
favorable picture of judicial conceptual understanding than the
Gatowski and Kovera results is not surprising. Many of the federal
opinions follow a Rule 104A Daubert hearing in which the court has
heard the parties and their experts discuss and brief the merits of the
expert knowledge in question. Moreover, more federal judges have
enjoyed some education in research methodology through Federal
Judicial Center programs. Unfortunately, fewer state court judges
have this opportunity nor do they have the luxury of lengthy
admissibility hearings or a clerk to assist them in their decision
making.
Even if a survey of federal judges demonstrated that they could
provide a clear definition of the Daubert criteria, this does not mean
that judges employ the criteria wisely. Knowledge is not the same
thing as judgment. Unfortunately, at the federal level there does not
exist any individual level data on the merits of judicial decisions to
admit or exclude. What is available is aggregate data from a recent
212
Rand study on the effects of Daubert on civil litigation. In this study,
Dixon and Gill analyze 399 federal district court opinions between
January 1980 and June 1999 that addressed challenges to expert
213
evidence in civil cases.
Many of the opinions analyzed more than
one element of evidence and the researchers separately coded 601
211

See FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFC EVIDENCE, supra note 21, ch. 34-35. This
intuition that non-Daubert factors have played an increasingly important role is
supported by a recent Rand study on the effect of Daubert. Dixon and Gill note that:
after Daubert, challengers and judges initially focused on the Daubert
factors when challenging and evaluating reliability. . . . As time passed,
however, and judges gained experience in evaluating reliability and
appellate court opinions reinforced their authority, challengers and
judges would have felt less compelled to address each Daubert factor
and instead paid increasing attention to more general factors
important to assessing reliability.
Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert Evidence in
Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 251, 284-85
(2002).
212
Dixon & Gill, supra note 211.
213
This group consisted of a thirty-three percent random sample of 1,345 civil
cases that a Westlaw search identified as dealing with admissibility of expert
testimony. Id. at 264.

930

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:881

elements.
Nearly half of the cases involved personal injury.
Contracts and business torts (16%) was the next largest category.
Fifteen percent of the cases were lumped into a general “other and
214
unknown” category. Approximately eighty percent of the evidence
discussed in the opinions was proposed by plaintiffs, and a similar
percentage of the challenges came from defendants.
The researchers concluded that during the period of their study,
judges did scrutinize expert testimony more carefully and applied
stricter admissibility standards, not only with respect to the reliability
215
factor but also with respect to relevance and expert qualifications.
This trend began even before the Daubert opinion and continued
after that opinion.
Moreover, challenges to expert evidence
216
increasingly resulted in a summary judgment.
Dixon and Gill are especially interested in how litigants
responded to this tightening in standards. They observe that up until
1997, the proportion of evidence excluded increases consistent with
the stricter scrutiny under Daubert. After 1997, however, there is a
decline in the percentage of evidence elements excluded, controlling
217
for type of case. The authors assume that the admissibility standard
did not change in this period and, therefore, concluded that this
declining rate is consistent with one or both of the following factors.
It could be that the declining rate occurred because the parties,
emboldened by past successes, extend their challenges to relatively
better evidence and their success rates on the margin decline. On
the other hand, it could be that challenges are less successful,
because the parties have responded to heightened scrutiny by
offering, on average, better evidence. In the authors’ judgment, both
218
processes may have been at work.
Dixon and Gill are careful to note what their study cannot do: it
cannot specifically address the question of how well judges are
performing the gatekeeping function. There are some indicia that
federal judges were becoming more sophisticated in their
explanations for exclusion. In the first few years after Daubert, judges
seem to have been feeling their way and their opinions hewed closely
to the Daubert criteria.
Over time, however, as judges gained experience in evaluating
reliability and as appellate court opinions reinforced their
214
215
216
217
218

Id. at 267.
Id. at 274, 291.
Id. at 294-96.
Id. at 292-93.
Dixon & Gill, supra note 211, at 299.
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authority, they appear to have felt less compelled to address each
Daubert factor and to have paid increasing attention to more
general issues important to addressing reliability. Of particular
note was the rapid rise in the frequency with which judges
addressed the clarity and coherence of the expert’s explanation
of the theory, methods, and procedures underlying the
219
evidence.

But greater sophistication does not necessarily mean better
220
judgment. The authors suggest a research design that would have a
panel of experts assess the reliability of admitted and excluded
221
evidence.
In sum, the data available to address Goldman’s fourth factor is
limited and somewhat contradictory. At the state level, the Gatowski,
Kovera, and McAuliff research should give pause as to the ability of
courts to apply some Daubert factors. At the federal level, the Dixon
and Gill paper offers persuasive evidence that expert evidence has
been subjected to greater scrutiny and the discussion of the evidence
in judicial opinions exhibits greater sophistication than in the years
immediately following Daubert.
However, we have only
impressionistic evidence about the “correctness” of these opinions.
Indeed, we probably do not have much agreement about what
constitutes a “correct” outcome. Dixon and Gill’s proposal would
constitute a first step, but only a first step. Even if one could reduce
concepts such as reliability to a single dimension, and then rank
order opinions along such a dimension, one would still be left with
the question of the optimal degree of scrutiny.
E. The Availability of Other Alternate Channels of Communication
That Address the Same Topic
For the purposes of this paper, Goldman’s final criterion might
219

Id.
Psychologists are likely to make this point by distinguishing between coherence
and correspondence. Most psychological research on decision making involves
coherence theories and tries to explain the process by which a person’s judgements
are logical and rational, or not. Correspondence theories, on the other hand, are
designed to explain why or why not a person’s judgments achieve empirical accuracy.
See Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of
the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 1941 (2002). Of
course there may be a correlation between coherence and correspondence, but one
does not perfectly predict the other. Judges may “talk a good Daubert game” and still
get it wrong in much the same way that Judge Shoob talked a good demeanor game
in the spermicide case, but got it wrong.
221
The authors also note that their study did not address the question of costs nor
could it assess Daubert’s overall affect on case outcomes. Dixon & Gill, supra note 211,
at 301-02.
220
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be put as follows: are there other, perhaps better, ways to assist jurors
than restricting the information they hear? The Kansas Supreme
Court, for example, argued in Kuhn that the traditional tools of
attorney argument—opposing experts and vigorous crossexamination—are sufficient to guard against decisions based on
unreliable evidence.
Diamond and her colleagues examined this proposition within
222
the context of a criminal case. The stimulus involved the testimony
of an expert modeled after a Dr. James Grigson, a psychiatrist who
regularly testified for the prosecution in death penalty cases on the
223
issue of future dangerousness. Typically, Dr. Grigson would testify
that the defendant constituted an ongoing danger. For example, in
Barefoot v. Estelle, he stated that there was a “one-hundred percent and
absolute chance” the defendant would commit future crimes of
224
In the experiment, the jury, drawn from the Cook
violence.
County, Illinois jury pool, watched a seventy-five minute videotape of
a death penalty hearing involving an armed robbery and murder of a
225
stranger who the defendant robbed in order to buy beer.
In three conditions of the experiment, the jurors heard the
prosecution’s expert state that he had diagnosed the defendant as a
sociopath, based solely on an examination of records of prior court
proceedings, pre-sentence reports, and prison records. The expert
concluded that the defendant was “certain to kill again” if he was not
executed.
The expert asserted that he had extensive prior
experience in making such predictions, and his predictions were
226
generally accurate.
In the first, “weak cross-examination” condition, the defense
only brought out the fact that the witness usually testified for the
227
state, but did not challenge the future dangerousness prediction.
In the second, “strong cross-examination” condition, the defense
222

Shari Se. Diamond et al., Juror Reactions to Attorneys at Trial, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 17 (1996).
223
In Texas, where Dr. Grigson most frequently testified, the jury could not
impose the death sentence unless they concluded that the defendant was likely to
“commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b)(1) (Vernon 2002).
224
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 919 (1983).
225
Diamond et al., supra note 222, at 19.
226
Id. at 38.
227
There is some evidence that this is a typical cross in many circumstances. My
experience in reading the trial transcripts of seven Bendectin trials is that the vast
majority of cross is devoted to expert qualifications and potential sources of bias.
Margaret Kovora et al., Assessment of the Commonsense Psychology Underlying Daubert, 8
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 180, 192 (2002) (reporting a similar result).
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added to the cross in the weak condition by pointing out at length
that the expert’s prediction of future killing was inconsistent with
prior research and that the expert has not employed the standard
methods for diagnosing future dangerousness. The witness admitted
on the stand that the best scientific literature indicates that two-thirds
of dangerousness predictions prove to be incorrect. The crossexamination also brought out the fact that the expert had never
published his findings in peer-reviewed journals. The expert
responded that he was focused on clinical diagnosis, not publication,
228
and that he was confident he was correct.
In the third, “strong
cross-examination plus defense expert” condition, the defense lawyer
conducted the same cross-examination as in the strong-cross
condition. In addition, a defense expert, who was also a psychiatrist,
testified that the defendant coped reasonably well but on rare
occasions excessive drinking interacted with a personality disorder to
produce violence. The defense expert testified that predictions
about future violence could not be made with any certainty, but that
in his view, the likelihood of future similar violence was not great and
229
the defendant was a good candidate for an alcohol abuse program.
In a fourth “control” condition, the plaintiff expert made a
realistic prediction, basically agreeing with the defense expert that
predictions of future dangerousness are accurate only about onethird of the time, but warned about the defendant’s potential for
future violence. The cross-examination was identical to the cross in
230
the first condition.
The dependent variables in the study included a question about
the persuasiveness of the state’s expert, the jury verdict preference
(death or life), and a verdict confidence index. The first condition,
with a strong prediction of future dangerousness, no opposing
expert, and a weak cross should produce the highest percentage of
death penalty verdicts.
If cross-examination is an effective
prophylactic against unreliable testimony, the second condition
should produce lower persuasiveness scores and a lower percentage
of death penalty verdicts. And the combination of a powerful cross
and an opposing expert should produce still lower persuasiveness
scores and even fewer death penalty verdicts. Ideally, this version

228

Diamond et al., supra note 222, at 39.
Id.
230
My discussion of this condition and the results come from a chapter of an as
yet unpublished book by Diamond and Casper. SHARI S. DIAMOND & JONATHAN D.
CASPER, UNDERSTANDING JURIES, ch. 4: The Influence of Experts (forthcoming in
200_).
229
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would produce jury judgment indistinguishable from the fourth
version in which the expert reported a one in three chance of being
231
correct.
In fact, neither the strong cross, nor the strong cross plus the
opposing expert had a significant affect on the plaintiff expert’s
persuasiveness, percentage of juries opting for death, or verdict
confidence. For example, in the weak cross condition forty-seven
percent of the juries gave a death verdict, in the strong cross
condition fifty-one percent recommended death, and in the strong
cross plus opposing expert fifty percent recommended death. The
only condition with a different result was in the fourth, “control”
condition where the plaintiff’s expert testified that predictions were
wrong two-thirds of the time. In this condition, thirty-nine percent of
232
the juries recommended the death penalty.
Diamond and Casper
note that one possible interpretation of these results is that the jurors
simply did not care about future dangerousness. However, based on
evidence from their deliberations, this is not the case. Most juries
explicitly discussed the issue, and there was a strong correlation
between predictions of future dangerousness and verdict
233
preferences.
However, jury estimates of future dangerousness if
released did not vary significantly across the three conditions where
234
the plaintiff’s expert testified the defendant would kill again.
Another recent future dangerousness experiment using
undergraduates as subjects by Krauss and Sales also explored the
effects of cross-examination and opposing experts on juror
235
evaluations.
The jurors heard two types of experts give testimony.
The “clinical opinion expert” based his judgment that the defendant
was a severe sociopath and represented a future danger to society on
his interview with the defendant and his years of experience. The
“actuarial expert” had identical experience and training as the
clinical expert. This expert used a dangerousness prediction
actuarial instrument called the Violence Risk Assessment Guide
(VRAG) to assess future dangerousness. The expert explained the
instrument and testified that based on his interview with the
defendant and the VRAG results, he believed the defendant

231

DIAMOND & CASPER, supra note 230, at 41.
Id. at 41 t.4.
233
Id. at 43.
234
Id. at 43 t.5.
235
Krauss & Sales, supra note 154. Unfortunately, this study did not have the
subjects deliberate, minimizing its ecological validity.
232
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236

represented a future danger to society.
The results indicated that
the clinical expert was more effective than the actuarial expert in
changing the mock juror’s dangerousness ratings.
The testimony of both types of experts was met with opposing
expert testimony and an effective cross-examination that pointed out
the high error rates of predictions of future dangerousness. In this
experiment, the cross-examination and opposing expert reduced
mock juror assessment of future dangerousness from where it was
after hearing the first expert’s testimony. However, Krauss and Sales
note that, “although adversary procedures had an impact on both
types of expert testimony, their influence was significantly less on the
clinical opinion expert testimony. Adversary procedures failed to
return mock jurors who received clinical opinion expert testimony to
237
their initial dangerousness rating levels.”
These studies suggest
that, perversely, the Kuhn court may have had it backward when it
suggested that clinical pure opinion testimony could be effectively
countered through cross-examination and opposing expert
testimony. The limited research available suggests that this type of
testimony is more impervious to cross-examination and opposing
238
experts than technique evidence.
These studies do not resolve the question of the effectiveness of
the “battle of the experts” and cross-examination. Seidman and
Casper offer the possibility that future dangerousness testimony is
particularly difficult to overcome because it is consistent with beliefs
239
and expectations already held by the jurors.
However, the results
240
are consistent with a study by Kovera and her colleagues.
They
varied the strength of the defense’s cross-examination of an expert
witness. Although manipulation checks revealed that jurors were
sensitive to the relative strength of the cross-examination of the
expert, this did not affect participant’s perceptions of the quality of
the evidence nor did it affect the verdict. This result was replicated in

236

Id. at 286-87.
Id. at 302.
238
This may be due in part to the fact that jurors confronted with holistic
experience testimony are not provided with the decompositional decision strategies
that have been shown to improve complex decision making. See Osvaldo F. Morera &
David Budescu, Random Error Reduction in Analytic Hierarchies: A Comparison of Holistic
and Decompositional Decision Strategies, 14 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 223 (2001).
239
Id. at 53. There is research supporting the proposition that mock jurors hold
strong beliefs concerning the ability of clinicians to predict future dangerousness
and that they overestimate clinician accuracy. Krauss & Sales, supra note 154, at 276.
240
Margaret Kovera et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Effects of
Expert Evidence Type and Cross-Examination, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 653 (1994).
237
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241

a second study by the same authors. Together, these experimental
findings should give pause to the Kuhn court and others who believe
that the traditional tools of the adversarial process are a full substitute
to restrictions on the admissibility of unreliable expert testimony.
These results raise another issue as well. They lend support to
the argument that rulings excluding unreliable evidence promote
jury accuracy even if we assume jurors are as good as judges in
assessing reliability. Edward Imwinkelried sets forth this justification
for Daubert in the following passage:
The criterion is not whether the judge is more competent to
decide the issue than the jury. Rather, the test is whether there is
a significant risk that the jurors’ exposure to the foundational
testimony and the proffered evidence will distort their
deliberations even when they make a conscious decision that the
242
item of evidence is technically inadmissible.

If any opinion evidence is to be excluded because of an inadequate
foundation, these experminents support the idea that it is better to
separate the admissibility decision from the decision as to how much
weight to give some testimony.
CONCLUSION: SUMMARIZING THE RESEARCH
Goldman’s five criteria offer one roadmap through the
empirical literature on juries, judges, and the admissibility of expert
testimony. Jurors have trouble understanding expert testimony,
especially in complex cases that involve statistical and probabilistic
evidence. This difficulty affects how they relate to expert witnesses.
When the nature of the testimony is such that it is difficult for jurors
to understand, they are more likely to engage in peripheral
processing; that is they rely on factors other than the merits of the
argument itself to determine the truth value of a message. Such
factors may include the expert’s credentials, the expert’s demeanor,
how much the expert is paid, whether the expert’s findings have
been published, and the number of experts (rather than the quality
of their testimony).
Expert opinion that rests solely on the experience of the expert
may create similar problems for jurors. The Supreme Court’s ipse
243
dixit comment in Joiner can be understood in part as a recognition
that whether or not an expert’s bare assertion based on professional
241

Kovera et al., supra note 148, at 362.
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Commentary: Logerquist v. McVey: The Majority’s Flawed
Procedural Assumptions, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121, 132-33 (2001).
243
General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
242
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judgment is correct, such statements offer the jury no opportunity to
engage in central processing and force it to accept or reject the
244
assertion, presumably on other, often peripheral grounds.
Juror difficulties potentially are made worse by the status of the
experts. American expert witnesses are almost exclusively employed
by the parties within the context of an adversarial proceeding. In
most contexts, when one is embedded in an adversarial process, one’s
testimony is biased in favor of the side one is representing. However,
the effect of these biases on jurors in unclear. There is evidence that
jurors give greater scrutiny to adversarial versus non-adversarial
expert witnesses. Whether this greater scrutiny is sufficient to permit
jurors to detect and discount expert bias is a question for which we
have little empirical data.
The fact that the parties choose the experts has another
potentially misleading aspect. The system favors selection of experts
with extreme views, rather than views that are representative of the
scientific community. There is some evidence that this gives jurors
the impression that there is less consensus in a field than actually
exists. Moreover, when we assess who to believe in situations where
we are confronted with different versions of the truth, we may turn to
demeanor as a clue to veracity. This type of peripheral processing is
in fact encouraged by the legal system. Unfortunately, demeanor is
often a poor cue, and in the case of expert testimony, the usefulness
of demeanor cues is further attenuated by selection effects.
If it is true that jurors will have a difficult time assessing the
merits of the experts’ arguments in complex cases, and the process of
selection and presentation of evidence is likely to diminish the
usefulness of many peripheral cues to veracity, close scrutiny of
testimony is potentially most beneficial in complex cases where
peripheral processing is most likely. Jurors may still engage in this
type of processing, but the elimination of the least reliable evidence
should reduce the egregiousness of errors that are made.
But if jurors and experts are the problem, are admissibility rules
imposed by judges the answer? If the judge is to act as a gatekeeper,
what evidence do we have that he or she is up to the task? This
question has two parts. First, do judges have the skills to judge expert
evidence, and second, in the context of a trial can they use the skills
they have to sort out reliable and unreliable testimony. Empirical
research on these questions is limited and somewhat contradictory. A
survey of state judges indicates a shallow understanding of some

244

See Sanders, Kumho and How We Know, supra note 184, at 373, 408.

938

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:881

Daubert criteria, but a study of published federal court opinions
suggests that as federal judges gain experience in evaluating
reliability, their opinions became more scientifically sophisticated.
Unfortunately, we do not have systematic evidence as to whether
greater sophistication produces better decisions, that is, decisions
that reliably distinguish between more and less reliable expert
testimony.
Even if judges are no better than jurors in assessing expert
evidence, the Diamond and Casper research support the position of
some evidence scholars that final outcomes will be better if the task of
assessing admissibility is separated from the task of assigning the
proper weight to each piece of evidence.
In sum, I believe on balance, the empirical research does lend
some support to the paternalistic justification for restrictions on the
admissibility of unreliable expert testimony. We are still left with
many questions, however. The following two seem to me to be
particularly important. First, is reliability a good principle upon
which to base decisions? Second, how stringent should admissibility
criteria be?
As to the first question, in my judgment reliability is a serviceable
criterion. Reliability itself is a complex, multidimensional set of
245
considerations.
Its very complexity can be a source of trouble, as
seen in the survey of state court judges, but its complexity also allows
judges to make sophisticated judgments.
Evidence from the Rand study suggests that courts have used the
reliability test to exclude the most unreliable evidence. If this is the
case, the result is consistent with the adoption of what Nance calls a
“worst evidence principle:” “evidence law seeks to prevent jury error
by filtering out the really bad evidence that is likely to lead the jury
246
astray.” There is also some evidence that courts have been sensitive
to the quality of the available evidence when making admissibility
245

See Joseph Sanders, Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts after Daubert,
78 MINN. L. REV. 1387 (1994).
246
Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and the Critique of Evidence Theory, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1551, 1555 (2001). In a recent opinion adopting the Daubert standard, the
Nebraska Supreme Court expressed a similar view:
We are convinced that by shifting the focus to the kind of reasoning
required in science—empirically supported rational explanation—the
Daubert/Joiner/Kumho Tire Co. trilogy of cases greatly improves the
reliability of the information upon which verdicts and other legal
decisions are based. Because courts and juries cannot do justice in a
factual vacuum, the better information the fact finders have, the more
likely that verdicts will be just.
Schafersman v. Agland Coop., 631 N.W.2d 862, 876 (Neb. 2001).
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decisions. As better evidence becomes available, courts may not let
experts base opinions on less reliable evidence that would be
247
admissible in another context. This phenomenon, which might be
called a “better evidence principle,” suggests that judges are using
admissibility rulings to control advocates as well as juries. Nance
describes the advocate control approach as a way in which the judge,
as an agent for the jury, is able “to protect juries from the epistemic
consequences of third-parties’ choices—namely, the choices of the
248
advocates about what evidence to present and how to present it.”
Whether or not judges are doing a good job in individual cases, it
does appear that they are using admissibility decisions in a way that is
consistent with a focused paternalistic justification. The federal
opinion study of Dixon and Gill is consistent with the possibility that
in face of heightened judicial scrutiny, the parties themselves have
improved the overall quality of evidence.
249
The second question is how stringent should the courts be?
How good is good enough? Insofar as this is a question that solely
concerns overall trial accuracy, the theoretical answer is up to the
point where improvements in jury accuracy are offset by judicial
errors in excluding evidence. A more practical response might be
that courts should be especially vigilant in monitoring weak evidence
in cases involving complex questions, because jurors may have special
difficulty assigning proper weight to such testimony. This argument
applies at least as strongly to experience evidence (what the Kuhn
court called “pure opinion evidence”), as it does to other types of
testimony. As cases get closer on the merits, of course, the role of
admissibility decisions as a means of assisting juries diminishes, if, for
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David L. Faigman et al., How Good is Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under
Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645 (2000).
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Nance, supra note 246, at 1557.
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It is quite unlikely that the law of evidence will abandon restrictive evidentiary
rules, either in general or with respect to the admissibility of expert evidence. Rule
702 and Rule 403 embody such restrictions. The choice, therefore, does not include
a control version of the requirement of total evidence approach, but rather the
nature and extent of restrictions on expert testimony. My sense is that most litigants
are more concerned with the extent of the restrictions than they are with the legal
formula employed to discuss the restriction. If plaintiff lawyers are disturbed by
developments following the Supreme Court opinion in Daubert, I believe it is not
primarily because they have a conceptual preference for the admissibility criteria of
Frye. At the time Daubert was decided many plaintiff experts considered it to be a
conceptual victory. See Kenneth J. Chesebro, Taking Daubert’s “Focus” Seriously: The
Methodology/Conclusion Distinction, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1745 (1994). Current
objections exist primarily because decisions under the Daubert standard are thought
to be more restrictive. See Sanders et al., Trial Lawyer Perceptions of Expert
Knowledge, supra note 155.
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no other reason, than the fact that as cases are closer and closer on
250
the merits, it is not clear whether an outcome is more accurate.
Moreover, there are competing considerations. As I noted
above, some may disagree that the primary end in view of the law of
evidence and of the trial itself is to uncover the truth. They may
argue that procedural justice considerations should trump
substantive considerations and that both the parties and the society
will be more supportive of outcomes that are the result of a jury
verdict. This paper is not the place for a full discussion of the
relationship between substantive and procedural justice. However, a
few words are in order. Procedures that are perceived to be fair, help
to produce acquiescence even in the face of perceived outcome
unfairness. One well accepted theory advanced by Tyler and Lind
points to three factors that are important to the belief that
procedures are fair: (1) neutrality (the authority engages in
evenhanded treatment), (2) trust (the authority tries to be fair), and
(3) status recognition (the authority treats one politely, with dignity,
251
and with respect for one’s rights and opinions).
Adverse
admissibility decisions, especially if they result in a directed verdict
for the other party, may well be perceived to be unfair with respect to
one or more of these factors. For example, refusal to permit an
expert to testify might be perceived as a lack of respect for one’s
opinion.
Undoubtedly, the plaintiff’s personal injury bar feels strongly
that cases decided on the basis of the exclusion of expert opinion
evidence are less legitimate. Although most explain this position in
substantive terms, e.g. jury verdicts are more accurate, it may also be
true that their objection is partly procedural. Pushed, they might say
that jury judgments are “fairer,” and we should prefer them even if,
on average, juries reach more erroneous results in the absence of
admissibility rules that require reliable expert evidence.
The
question, of course, is how erroneous? Institutions that routinely fail
to achieve substantive justice are likely to lose political and social
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However, admissibility decisions do not have to be the only arrow in the
judge’s quiver. The jury’s difficulty in weighting complex testimony does not exist
only in the weakest cases. Court appointed experts, comments on the weight of the
evidence, and other devices may have a role to play in assisting the jury, especially in
the face of an adversarial process that often obscures as much as it clarifies.
Erichson, supra note 171. In addition, see Phoebe Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror
Comprehension and Public Policy, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 788 (2000), for a review of
research on the effectiveness of methods designed to assist jury comprehension.
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See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE
RESEARCH IN LAW (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001).
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support even if they are perceived to be procedurally just. The
purpose of just procedures is not solely a way to “cool out” the losers
in disputes. It is also a way to arrange things so as to come as close as
possible to achieving substantive justice. Unfortunately, procedures
designed to maximize substantive justice may conflict with
procedures that are designed to maximize the perception of
252
procedural justice.
As is so often the case in law, the question is
one of balance. Some may strike the balance more in favor of
procedural justice.
However one may weigh these competing concerns, we should
understand that the question of how high the admissibility hurdle
should be is not only a narrow question of evidence law. If the
paternalistic instinct that underlies Daubert has any merit when we ask
how high the bar should be, we are in part asking about the proper
balance between procedural and substantive justice. Unlike many
quarrels in law, this one is about something important.
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What we sorely need is more research on how people integrate their
assessment of these different dimensions. See Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton,
Justice and Legal Institutions, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW (Joseph
Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001).

